Alexander Wendt is one of the core social constructivist scholars in the field of international relations. He developed a theory of the international system as a social construction. He refers to his theory as a constructivist approach to international politics although he said that it is a kind of idealism, a structural idealism.

Wendt’s most influential work to date is Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1999), which was a jump off from his 1992 article “Anarchy is What States Make of It”.

In this book, Wendt divided the discussion of his theory into two levels: second order issues which refer to the ontology and epistemology and first order issues referring to the units and levels of analysis.

SUMMARY
Chapter 1: Four sociologies of international politics

In the first part of the book, Wendt explained the constructivist approach to international relations and from there he identified the kind of constructivism that he adhered to.  He identified the two basic tenets of constructivism: that “structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces” and that “the identities and interests of actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature.”  Because of these basic tenets, he argued that constructivism can be seen as a kind of “structural idealism.”

Wendt said there was a revival of the constructivist approach after the Cold war because mainstream IR theories had difficulty explaining the end of Cold war.  This problem, he says, stems from the materialist and individualist orientation of mainstream IR, and he argues that a more ideational and holistic view of international politics might do better.  He then identified three main streams of constructivist IR theory: the modernist stream associated with John Ruggie and Friedrich Kratochwil, the postmodernist stream associated with Richard Ashley and Rob Walker and the feminist stream associated with Spike Peterson and Ann Tickner.

Wendt admits that his brand of constructivism is a moderate one, as opposed to other constructivist theorists, because it concedes important points to materialist and individualist perspectives and because he endorses a scientific approach to social inquiry.  He says that even though norms and law govern most domestic politics, self-interest and coercion, ideas that are tied to the realist school, seem to rule international politics.  He argues that although identities are constructed by society, primary actors are much more autonomous from the social system in which they are embedded.

In this chapter, Wendt also discussed the different ontologies associated with the different schools of thought in IR.  Neorealists have a materialist ontology while neoliberals added the institutional superstructure to the material base.  Constructivists on the other hand, have an idealist ontology.

In order to explain the ontology of his theory, he first identified the four sociologies of structure involved in the ontological debate over social construction: individualism, holism, materialism and idealism.  For materialists, he says that the most fundamental fact about society is nature and the organization of material forces.  For idealists, on the other hand, the most fundamental fact about society is the nature and structure of social consciousness or what Wendt calls the distribution of ideas or knowledge.  The meaning and effects of material forces depend on the actors’ ideas.  For individualists, social scientific explanations depend on the properties or interactions of independently existing individuals while for holists, explanations should include the construction of agents in both causal and constitutive senses.

Using these four sociologies, Wendt provided a map to locate where the different theories of international politics may fall.  Classical realism and neorealism are both materialist and individualist.  The World-Systems Theory and Neo-Gramscian Marxism fall under materialist and holist theories.  Liberalism and neoliberalism, on the other hand, are both idealist and individualist while constructivism, postmodernist and feminist IR are holist and idealist theories.  Wendt said his theory belongs to the holist and idealist quadrant.  However, he clarifies in a succeeding chapter that an idealist ontology is not synonymous to utopianism.  It only means that to the extent that interests are constituted by beliefs, we can have more hope of changing them than we could, if interests simply reflected human nature.

In this chapter, Wendt also identified the units or levels of analysis in IR theories– state centrism and systems approach.  Wendt adhered to the systems approach and was actually critical to Kenneth Waltz’ state centrism.  He says that although Waltz claims to develop a systemic rather than a reductionist approach, he is ultimately an individualist because of his micro-economic analogy wherein he likened the international system to a market within which states compete.  Waltz’ neorealism is also defined by its materialism, which excludes social structures like relationships and international interaction.

Although Wendt recognized that states are dominant and that they should be the primary unit of analysis, he said that this does not preclude the possibility that non-state actors, whether domestic or transnational, have important and even decisive effects on the frequency and/or manner in which states engage in war.  He added that states are rarely found in complete isolation from each other; therefore, the international structure is a social, rather than a material phenomenon.  However, Wendt clarifies that material power and interests are still important although their meaning and effects depend on the social structure of the system.  The main difference, he says, between rationalists and constructivists is that the latter does not treat identity and interests as given but rather question where they came from.

Chapter 2: Scientific realism and social kinds

In this chapter, Wendt explained that it is possible to adopt idealist and holist ontologies while maintaining a positivist epistemology.  Empiricists say that the states and the international system cannot be observed by our senses and are therefore unobservable.  However, Wendt argues that states and the states system are real structures whose nature can be approximated through science.  He says that meaning is not entirely socially or mentally constructed and that the only way to generate reliable causal knowledge about the world is to include empirical evidence.

Wendt identifies three ways to remain objective despite the subjective nature of meanings.  One is to emphasize the role of material forces.  Another is to focus on the role of self-organization in the constitution of social kinds and third is for an IR scholar to confront the international system as an objective social fact, independent of one’s beliefs.

Chapter 3: “Ideas all the way down?”: on the constitution of power and interest

In chapter 3, Wendt argues against the belief in “ideas all the way down.”  He says that ideas have material causes but the meaning of power and the content of interests are largely a function of ideas.  He added that it cannot be ideas all the way down because scientific realism shows that ideas are based on and are regulated by an independently existing physical reality.  He mentioned three material forces that have independent effects on international life. The distribution of actors’ material capabilities, the composition of material capabilities, technology in particular, geography and natural resources all affect the possibility and likelihood of certain outcomes.  Because of this, Wendt argues that constructivism should not proceed as if nature did not matter.  

However, he says only a small part of what constitutes interests is actually material.  The material force constituting interests is human nature while the rest is ideational or constituted by shared ideas or culture.  Simply put, we want what we want because of how we think about it.  Wendt argued against the material view of interest by drawing from cultural anthropology and philosophy. 

Chapter 4: Structure, agency, and culture

Chapter 4 focused on the structure of ideas in the social system.  Wendt says that the structure of any social system contains three elements– material conditions, interests and ideas. All these elements are equally necessary to explain social outcomes.

In this chapter, Wendt also dealt with the ways in which distributions of ideas may be structured.  He said that knowledge can be private or shared.  The private knowledge of states often stem from domestic or ideological consideration.  The relevance of private knowledge however, goes beyond explaining the foreign policy behavior of individual states because when states start interacting with each other, their privately held beliefs immediately become a “distribution” of knowledge that may have emergent effects.

On the other hand, socially shared knowledge or culture is knowledge that is both common and connected between individuals. Culture takes many specific forms, including norms, rules, institutions, ideologies, etc.

Wendt also discussed how people overcome indeterminacy and coordinate their expectations around particular outcomes.  One factor is common knowledge, which concerns actors’ beliefs about each other’s rationality, strategies, preferences, and beliefs about other states.  Another factor is collective knowledge or knowledge structures held by groups which generate macro-level patterns in individual behavior over time. As opposed to common knowledge, the effects of collective knowledge are not reducible to individuals’ beliefs. Another factor mentioned by Wendt is collective memory, which are myths, narratives, and traditions that constitute who a group is and how it relates to others. 

With this discussion, Wendt jumps off to discuss culture, which, according to him, is more than a summation of the shared ideas that individuals have in their heads but a “communally sustained” and thus inherently public phenomenon.  He emphasized that culture both have causal and constitutive effects.  Constructivists, he says, should be more interested on the constitutive effects of culture, which focuses on the relationship between agency and structure based on mutual constitution.  

Wendt also wanted to retain a moderate holism about culture, in which agents and structure can be both mutually constituted and co-determined.  He says that no matter how much the meaning of an individual’s thought is socially constructed, all that matters for explaining his behavior is how matters seem to him.  Therefore, agents have a role to play in social explanation which cannot be reduced to culture.

For Wendt, culture is a self-fulfilling prophecy.  Given cause to interact in some situation, actors need to define the situation before they can choose a course of action.  These definitions will be based on their own identities and interests and what they think others will do.  This is opposed to Waltz’s more deterministic argument.

In this chapter, Wendt also criticized Waltz’ focus on two levels of analysis– states and the international system.  He says that when you separate these two levels of analysis, you separate structure from the agents and practices by which it is produced.  Wendt identified three levels of analysis relevant to theorizing about world politics.  First is the unit-level analysis, which explains individual choices.  Second is the interaction level, which goes further than unit-level theories, and explains the overall outcomes of interaction.  The third level is methodological individualism, which looks at the properties and/or interactions of independently existing agents.  Wendt says methodological individualism is a useful tool for analyzing many of the unintended, emergent outcomes of social life.

Chapter 5: The state and the problem of corporate agency

In chapter 5, Wendt argued that states are real actors to which we can legitimately attribute qualities like desires, beliefs and intentionality.  This is an argument against other theorists who say that the state is not really an actor at all, but merely a “theoretical construct.”  

The essential state (not just a construct) is an organizational actor embedded in an institutional-legal order that constitutes it with sovereignty and a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence over a society in a territory.

Wendt argues that state actors are real and not reducible to the individuals who instantiate them.  Authorization makes individual’s actions the actions of a collective.

In this chapter, Wendt also discussed the four types of identities.  Personal or corporate identities are those constituted by self-organizing, homeostatic structures like memories and consciousness that make actors distinct entities.  Type identities are social categories or labels applied to persons who share (or are thought to share) some characteristic/s in appearance, behavioral traits, attitudes, values, skills, knowledge, etcetera.  Role identities are those that exist in relation to others while collective identity occurs when the Self is categorized as the Other or when a single identity is created.

Wendt is quick to point out that without interests, identities have no motivational force and without identities, interests have no direction.  George and Keohane identified these interests as physical survival, autonomy and economic well-being.  Wendt added a fourth one, collective self-esteem.  Collective self-esteem refers to a group’s need to feel good about itself, for respect or status. These four interests are needs that must be met if state-society complexes are to be secure, and as such they set limits on what state can do in their foreign policies.

Finally, Wendt answers the question whether states are self-interested by nature.  He argues that we cannot understand self-interest without understanding the Self and especially its relationship to the Other.  He says that despite their biological bias toward self-interest, human beings are social animals, and probably would never have formed societies were they always self-interested.

Chapter 6: Three cultures of anarchy

In chapter 6, Wendt focused on the idea of anarchy.  He says that there are three cultures of anarchy, represented by different roles they portray: Hobbesian (represented by enemy), Lockean (represented by rival) and Kantian (represented by friend).  He argues that the structure and tendencies of anarchic systems will depend on which of these three roles—enemy, rival, and friend—dominate the systems.

The logic of Hobbesian anarchy is “war of all against all” (self-help system).  In this culture, states have shared knowledge of at least three things: (1) that they are dealing with other states, (2) that these beings are their enemies and therefore threaten their life and liberty, and (3) how to deal with their enemies—how to make war, communicate threats, arrange surrenders, balance power and so on.  

Lockean anarchy, on the other hand, is based on the role structure of rivalry rather than enmity.  Unlike enemies, rivals expect each other to act as if they recognize their sovereignty and should not try to conquer or dominate them.  Unlike friends however, the recognition among rivals does not extend to the right to be free from violence in disputes.  

Lastly, Kantian culture is based on a role structure of friendship, within which states expect each other to observe two simple rules: the rule of non-violence wherein disputes will be settled without war or the threat of war, and the rule of mutual aid wherein they will fight as a team if the security of any one is threatened by a third party.  Kantian culture occurs when collective security norms are internalized.

Wendt says these cultures can be internalized in three degrees, which yield three ways for how it may be realized.  First is through force, which is related to the traditional realist hypothesis.  Second is through price, associated with neoliberalism and rationalism.  Third is through the acceptance of legitimacy, associated with the idealists and constructivists.

In short, what gives anarchy meaning are the kinds of people who live there and the structure of their relationships.  Wendt says that no structure is easy to change and the more deeply that a structure of shared ideas penetrates actors’ identities and interests, the more resistant to change it will be.   He discusses this point in the final chapter of the book.

Chapter 7: Process and structural change

Constructivist social theory is often associated with the belief that change is easy but Wendt argues that structural change (cultural change) is quite difficult.  The more deeply culture is internalized by actors, the more difficult it will be to change.

Wendt identified two causal pathways through which identities may evolve: natural and cultural selection.  Natural selection occurs when organisms who poorly adapts to the competition for scarce resources in an environment, fail to reproduce and are replaced by the better adapted.  Wendt says that because of the institution of sovereignty, modern states have a low death rate; therefore natural selection will not be an important factor in the evolution of state identities in the future.  

The other pathway through which identities may evolve is through cultural selection.  Cultural selection is an evolutionary mechanism involving “the transmission of the determinants of behavior from individual to individual, and thus from generation to generation, by social learning, imitation or some other similar process.”  Wendt examines the two mechanisms of cultural selection: imitation and social learning.

In imitation, identities and interests are acquired when actors adopt the belief of those whom they perceive as “successful.”  Wendt however, was more interested in complex social learning, wherein identities and their corresponding interests are learned and then reinforced in response to how actors are treated by significant Others.  

Wendt identified four variables in collective identity formation: interdependence, common fate, homogeneity and self-restraint.  These four variables are present in the evolution of a collective identity.  Finally, Wendt concluded that structural change is not easy.  It is path dependent, which means that collective identity formation in international politics takes place against a cultural background.

REVIEW

Unlike other IR scholars, Wendt gave special attention to first and second order issues, particularly the ontological and epistemological debates in IR theories.  By doing so, he was able to find a niche for himself, molding his own brand of constructivism.  

His theory bridges the gap between traditional constructivist approach and neorealism, an important feat because as he mentioned in his book, most IR scholars do not take theories seriously if they do not have any hint of realism in it.  By combining constructivist and neorealist ideas, Wendt produced a very systematic, structured and holist approach to the study of international relations.

Another important aspect in Wendt’s theory is his adherence to the scientific approach to the study of IR.  In this sense, his approach is somewhere between those of realist scholars like Hans Morgenthau and E.H. Carr who both claim that the study of international relations can be scientific, using observable conditions or objective realities as their basis of analysis.  However, Wendt does not discount the fact that realities are value-laden that is why he mentioned that the IR scholar must be aware of his o her biases and must confront the international system as a social fact.  This is quite similar to Robert Cox’s argument that theory is always value-laden.

Some scholars dismiss Wendt’s work as unconvincing particularly his arguments towards the importance of a holist rather than an individualist ontology.  Others claim that scientific realism and social constructivism are incompatible but I argue otherwise.  Through his analysis of particular events in history, Wendt was able to show how indeed compatible the ideas of both theories are.

Realist critics also argue that Wendt did not adequately address a critical aspect of the realist worldview: the problem of uncertainty.  However, I think Wendt’s inclusion of methodological individualism in the levels of analysis shows that he is aware that uncertainty is indeed present in the system and he recognizes this in his analysis.

Another criticism thrown against Wendt’s theory is the argument of realists that by differentiating the cultures of anarchy in terms of the degree of cooperative behavior, he seemed to have reinforced the underpinning realist argument that what drives behavior at the lower levels of internalization are the private incentives of selfish interests.  They question how one can be sure that states who cooperate really reflect a peaceful character and that the state is not just masking his own aggressive desires.  I think Wendt was able to address this when he gave more importance to the constitutive rather than causal effects of cultures.  Cultures, he says, do not always lead to more cooperation.  Although Wendt’s theory leans on the idealist ontology, he is quick to point out that he is not a utopian.

In conclusion, the strength of this book lies in its ontological discussion because in order to explain how the international system works, we must be able to know what it is made of and how it is structured. 

Yone Minagawa, 114 years old and Tomoji Tanabe, 111 years old, are the oldest living individuals on earth as recorded by the Guiness Book of World Records. Both are now living in Japan, which has one of the world’s longest average life spans. This factor is often attributed to the Japanese’ healthy diet of fish and rice. Japan’s centenarian population has quadrupled in the past 10 years and is expected to reach nearly one million in 2050.

Population aging is a worldwide phenomenon. According to the 2005 Human Development Report, it is taking place worldwide except for 18 countries. Scholars say that approximately one in five persons will be aged 65 or over in the 21st century.

Rapidly aging population refers to the change in age distribution or age structure of a population toward older ages. An increase in the population’s median age, a decline in the proportion of the population composed of children and a rise in the number of elderly people are all aspects of population aging.

Population aging is progressing rapidly in many industrialized countries but developing countries are also experiencing rapid increases in their proportion of elderly people. This pattern is expected to continue over the next decades.

The elderly today have attained higher levels of education and economic position than their counterparts in the past. These factors including their rising number has made the elderly a major social and political force in the world. And because older populations are increasing on a global basis, the issues and problems associated with aging are worldwide.

This paper takes a look at the global phenomenon of rapidly aging population. It gives an overview of the recent trend in world demographics, what brings about population aging, its economic effects particularly on labor, what it means for the social security system particularly the health and pension sector and its impact on migration processes. Finally, this paper takes a look at the possible solutions to this issue and how interstate policies must be changed in order to reverse the process of population aging and impede its detrimental effects.

What causes population aging?

Population aging is a consequence of two important population processes: fertility decline or the lowering of birth rates and mortality decline at older ages.

Improved nutrition, sanitation, housing and health care combined to help promote longer lives for most people. Successes in preventing infectious diseases that benefit infants and young children is one factor in prolonging the lifespan at early ages. Mortality decline in older age groups, particularly among women has also been a dominant factor in the current aging. In general, economic development has accounted for the lower mortality rate.

Not only are more people now living to reach older ages, but birthrate has also been declining. John Stuart Mill, one of the early demographers believed that women empowerment has become important to population growth regulation. A number of women today are averse to the idea of having many children. Related to this is George Stolnitz’ idea that the demographic transition towards lower birth rates is closely linked to modernization. As societies modernize, family life is weakened by industrial and urban life. Another scholar, Kingsley Davis, however, believes that the desire to maintain one’s relative status in society is the most powerful motive for fertility limitation.

Of the two population processes, fertility decline is seen as the more dominant contributor to population aging.

Aging Populations Around the World

Demographers consider a population “young” if individuals under age 15 comprise more than 35% of the total number. On the other hand, a population is said to be “old” or “aged” if individuals 65 or older comprise more than about 10% of the total population.

Population aging is greatly felt in more developed countries today, but it is projected that the expansion of the world’s elderly population is going to be greatest in developing nations in the next decades.

Today, Western Europe has the highest percentage of elderly. The population of Europe is projected to slide over the coming decades and the decline will be rapid. For example, Germany, which is currently the largest country in the 27-member European Union, with over 80 million population, could find itself with just 25 million people at the end of the century, some estimates suggest.

Germany, Italy and Spain all have birthrates under 1.4 while other EU members like Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic and Poland have birthrates of below 1.3. Among the EU countries, only France and Ireland have positive birthrates. In 2006, Nicholas Eberstadt, a demographer at the American Enterprise Institute, announced that it was the first year when deaths exceeded births in Western Europe.

On the other hand, Asia has the older persons in terms of absolute numbers. It is also expected to show the greatest increases in both numbers and percentages of the elderly by 2025.

East Asia (China, North and South Korea and Japan) for example, has been recorded as one the most dynamic and vibrant region of the world since World War II, characterized by rapid economic growth and social progress. The region has also experienced demographic changes, characterized by improvements in life expectancy and fertility decline. Continued increases in age at marriage and an increase in female participation in economic activity could further lower the level of fertility in this region. Estimates by the United Nations indicate that the percentage of the population 65 years and older in East Asia will increase from about 10 percent in 2000 to 25 percent by 2050. This will occur simultaneously with a decline in the working age population from 70 to 60 percent of the total.

One compelling case of rapidly aging population is that of Japan. The aging of the population in Japan took place more rapidly than in any other nation in the late twentieth century owing to the fact that it has the highest overall life expectancy of any nation in the world. With only 10 percent of its population aged 5 and below in 1985, Japan will see its proportion of the elderly increase to 20.3 percent by 2025. Within the next 50 years, it is projected that Japan’s elderly will exceed one third of the total population, while those of working age will decline to one half.

China, on the other hand, is likely to age faster than any other country because of its large population. China, through its one child policy per married couple has greatly decreased birthrates through the 1970s and 1980s.

South Korean population has also undergone the aging process since the 1960s. Fertility decline was the most important factor in the early process of population aging. This is a result of the changing attitudes of women toward marriage, the rising age at which women get married and the rise in incidences of divorce. Around 2018, it is projected that the number o f aged in South Korea will surpass that of the youth population.

North Korea is also experiencing population aging although the degree is slightly behind that of South Korea.

Today, Japan and South Korea have already been experiencing labor shortages as a result of an aging population. China, on the other hand, still has an abundant labor supply and unemployment remains high. Although the long term trend for China and South Korea is similar to that of Japan, they will still continue to benefit from the expansion of the working age population for the next two to three decades.

Given this trend in world demographics towards older populations, the succeeding chapters shall discuss the impacts of an aging population with particular focus on the economy, the social security system, the health care sector and migration.

Aging Population, Labor Shortage and Other Economic Impacts

Japan, South Korea and China, during the next half-century, will move from a period of workforce expansion to significant workforce contraction. At the same time, their graying populations will require the shrinking workforce to shoulder the higher costs associated with the rapid aging of their populations.

In Japan, population will decline much sooner that will eventually result in a shrinking labor force as long as male-female participation rates in economic activity remain unchanged. Options such as increasing the retirement age would fail because new technologies demand a workforce that is both young and qualified. Unless Japanese women respond to the increased demand for labor, Japan will face more and more labor shortages. The current generation of young women in Japan however, is discouraged from seeking employment because they can rely in income transfers from their parents as well as inheritances to support them. Yet, this situation is likely to change radically in the future as savings diminish with the aging population. Japan may need to import millions of worker in the years ahead to fill gaps in the labor pool.

Europe also faces the problem of labor shortage. Because of population aging, EU member-states are projected to lose 60 million people from their workforce in 10 years. To date, there are more than one million unfilled jobs in Germany and Britain. Companies like Siemens, a German engineering giant and BT, the British telecommunications company are having trouble filling their job vacancies. Thus, during the recent World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, there was a call to urge the European Union to let in skilled immigrants to fill the labor shortages that will continue to grow as the workforce in Europe declines.

One distinct feature of population aging is that females tend to live much longer than males worldwide. Males exceed female death rates at all ages and for the leading cases of death, such as heart disease, cancer, stroke, accidents and pneumonia. Women are sick more often although with less serious health concerns but outlive men who die sooner from more life-threatening diseases.

The result of this feminization of the elderly population is that these elderly women often do not have the means to support themselves without spousal support and become dependent on their families or on state benefits. Thus, some of them are living below the poverty line, particularly those in developing countries.

Another impact of an aging population is that it may contribute to deflationary trends and pressures. Land and real property prices could begin to fall, particularly in rural areas, as a result of contracting demand since older people are more likely to save money than to spend.

Aging Population and the Social Security System

When people become very old, they require a greater share of public services and in developed countries, the task of taking care of the elderly has generally shifted from being a family responsibility to being more of a state’s responsibility.

However, with the shrinking of the labor force that funds the social security system of state, elderly benefits are affected especially in regions like Europe where pension systems are still largely funded by taxes on labor. In the future, welfare systems will be more and more difficult to keep afloat.

In the United States, the relatively fewer children resulting from the Baby Boom generation born between 1946 and 1964 and is now passing into middle age will require more money to finance old-age benefits because of the smaller working population. It has been reported that the U.S. Social security system may face a profound crisis if no radical changes are enacted. Some of the possible solutions being discussed are cuts in benefits, tax increases, massive borrowing, lower cost-of-living adjustments, later retirement ages or a combination of these elements to sustain retirement programs such as Medicare and Social Security.

In South Korea, elderly only households have increased greatly since 1980, and will increase further as population aging continues. Many of their elderly are poor and ailing, but are not eligible for free medical care and income subsidies that is why enlarging employment opportunities for the elderly is often recommended to enhance their quality of life.

Private companies running pension systems will also find it difficult to ignore what the insurance industry calls “longevity risk” or the chance that pension funds may run short of money because people are living longer. Longevity risk is already challenging Britain’s corporate pensions as well as the pension systems in Japan, Italy and Germany where the general population is aging.

Aging Population and the Health Care System

In the past, the task of taking caring of the elderly has been delineated to family members. However, with increased urbanization, the decline of the extended family, the increasing costs of health and nursing care, the changing needs of the elderly and the significant increase in their number have all contributed to the shift in the responsibility from the family to the state. Already now we are seeing more elderly being sent to nursing homes. Some elderly people choose to retire and migrate in other countries like the Philippines, where health care is cheaper for them than in their own countries. An example would be a number Japanese who live in elderly homes in the Philippines. Canada and the U.S. are also some of the top destinations of trained caregivers from the Philippines.

Population aging poses a great challenge to the health care systems of states. As populations age, there will be greater incidences of disability, frailty, and chronic diseases such as Alzheimer’s disease, cancer, cardiovascular and cerebrovascular diseases and the like. These diseases, which often afflict the elderly, need special attention and therefore higher costs. Some experts already raised concerns that mankind may become a “global nursing home” in the near future.

The largest expenditure of many countries now is health care. Health care costs and other social service benefits will continue to skyrocket as a result of increased longevity and the increased demand for institutional care at a time when family members, the traditional caregivers, will be forced to seek outside employment. Governments will therefore be left with choices between raising taxes, changing the tax system from labor to consumption or reducing the state’s role in providing health care.

In retrospect, other countries that may be able to provide health care like the Philippines may benefit economically from taking care of foreign elderly.

Aging Population and Migration

One of the immediate solutions seen to delay the effects of population aging is immigration. In Canada and Europe, immigrants have slowed down the aging process because they tend to be younger and have more children.

Migration also corrects for labor market imbalances. Japan, for example, is already experiencing rapid population aging and a shrinking workforce that, in the absence of migration, could adversely affect its economic growth and consequently the provision of social security and health care services to its elderly. In order to correct the labor shortage, Japanese leaders are scrambling to boost birthrate and to get more women and elderly in the workforce. However, many Japanese are now realizing that foreigners must become a part of the solution.

Despite these factors, migration policies continue to be restrictive in Japan. Its 2 million registered foreigners, 1.57 percent of the population, are at a record high but minuscule compared with the United States’ 12 percent. There remains a spurring debate on whether Japan, who had close its shores to foreigners for two centuries, should now open up to more foreign workers. Few support throwing the doors wide open. Instead, they want highly-skilled workers, engineers, educators and health professionals, preferably with Japanese-language skills.

Japanese officials are so touchy about the subject of immigration that they even deny that the country has an immigration policy at all. They speak of “foreign workers” instead of “immigrants” who might one day demand and receive citizenship. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has spoken vaguely of opening Japan’s doors to immigrants and authorities acknowledge they have not yet reached a consensus on this issue. What is apparent is that Japan is wary of emulating the large-scale immigration in the U.S. and it is also fearful of duplicating Germany’s problems with its guest workers who were welcomed when jobs were plentiful but are now suffering from unemployment. Perhaps, another reason why Japanese officials are not quite open to a more liberal immigration policy is that immigration in Japan does not have a happy history. The first wave of immigrants in modern times came a century or more ago from conquered lands in Korea and China, sometimes in chains as slaves. Those who are still in Japan, mostly Koreans and their descendants, are still suffering discrimination and isolation. During the Japanese economic boom in the late 1980s, labor shortage produced a change in visa laws to let in descendants of Japanese emigrants, some from Brazil but with Japanese lineage. However, these emigrants have continued to live in isolation and have failed to blend easily back into the Japanese society.

But despite these fears of opening Japan to more foreign workers, its failure to encourage migration will only bring about continued economic stagnation, if not rapid economic decline. Other solutions such as investment overseas or programs to resettle older persons abroad could provide only a temporary relief, because populations of many of the receiving countries like Thailand for example, will themselves begin to age soon and will be looking for investments abroad to keep their economies from contracting. Without increased migration, Japan will lose out on the benefits countries such as Canada and the United States have enjoyed–increased fertility rates and a stable, if not growing, workforce.

South Korea has also began to consider various new options for relaxing their migration controls-though it may fall short of granting residence and other rights, such as those given to migrants in the United Sates and Canada.

The United Nations Population Division issued a report in 2001 on the analysis of how much migration is needed in aging populations in order to make up for the population declines and the aging process. For this study, the United Nations population specialists selected ten countries and regions to use as case studies. In nine of the ten-case study countries and regions, it is assumed that fertility will rise moderately over the course of the next 50 years. The analysis showed how many migrants exactly would be required for each of the ten selected countries and regions just to maintain its population at the current size. The number of migrants needed would be very large.

On the other hand, there are also some scholars who think that immigration only provides temporary reprieve to the aging population and that it may do more good than harm on the receiving state. One scholar noted that the emigration of working-age adults even accelerates population aging, as it is observed now in some Caribbean nations. However, population aging in these countries is accelerated by the immigration of elderly retirees from other countries, and return migration of former emigrants who are above the average population age. Next we shall discuss some of the proposed solutions to population aging and the role of state and interstate processes in this global phenomenon.

What Needs to be Done and the Geopolitics of Population Aging

Population aging is indeed a global phenomenon as discussed in this paper and because of this, it requires international coordination of national and local actions. The United Nations and other international organizations have already developed recommendations intended to mitigate the adverse consequences of population aging. Their recommendations include “reorganization of social security system, changes in labor, immigration and family policies, promotion of active and healthy lifestyles, and more cooperation between the governments in resolving socioeconomic and political problems posed by population aging.”

On the reorganization of the social security system, it is imperative that the states are able to invest these funds properly so as to avoid losing the money needed by more elderly. In the Philippine setting for example, the Social Security System has been reportedly losing millions because of poor investments. For welfare states where pension funds are taken from taxes from labor, perhaps there should be a restructuring of the tax system, as mentioned earlier, from labor to consumption because of the shrinking workforce.

A person is “officially” old when he or she reaches the aged 65. This was chosen by the U.S. Social Security Administration in 1935 as the age of eligibility for old-age benefits. But except for this bureaucratic significance, being age 65 has no other particular relevance.

Charles Bowden and Alvin Burstein pointed out that the “myth that age necessarily involves an inability to produce is challenged by the numbers of second careers and examples of influence maintained by prominent individuals late into their lives.” They mentioned that both Ronald Reagan and George Bush were elected president of the United States while in their sixties while most members of the US Supreme Court and many members of Congress are already in old age but still serve in office.

Changes in labor would include a restructuring of the working age. On a positive note, elderly people are healthier now because more recent generations have a lower disease load. They can now live vigorous and active lives until a much later age than in the past and if they’re encouraged to be productive, elderly people can be economic contributors as well. The current intensive biomedical anti-aging studies may also help to extend the healthy and productive period of human life in the future.

The analysis of the United Nations population division in 2001 even went on to estimate how much the working ages would have to be raised beyond the conventional 65 to make up for low fertility and population aging in ten case-study countries. The study showed that the upper limit of the working ages would have to be raised to between 72 and 82 if the ten case-study countries were to admit no migrants over the first half of the twenty-first century. In Germany, Italy, Japan and the Republic of Korea, the working age would have to be extended to over 75. However if these countries were to admit enough migrants then the working age could extend to somewhere between 67 and 75.

Because the elderly are living longer while staying productive, work roles may change in which the aged are encouraged to remain longer in the work force because of a smaller population of younger workers. It would help if they are given the chance to choose whether to retire at the age of 65 or to continue to work but with added benefits.
Another change needed in the labor force is the increased involvement of women in countries who have been used to keeping women inside the home like the case of Japan and Korea. It has been said that the Japanese workforce would likely shrink by as much as a third by 2050 if more women and elderly workers are not hired.

Rigid immigration policies of states must also be rethinked especially in regions like Europe where politicians face an unusual task of finding workers for their companies while remaining hostile to immigration. As mentioned earlier, executives who gathered in Davos, Switzerland for the World Economic Forum are already urging this politically unpopular solution to let skilled immigrants fill the labor shortages.

David Arkless, head of corporate affairs at Manpower, a European employment firm, said that restriction on immigration flows in many European countries hampered companies from being able to match demand for skilled workers with vacancies. Immigration flows have declined in several European countries over the past decade, including Germany and Denmark. There are around 687,000 open jobs in Germany and closed borders, so there is no inclination to fill them
with immigrants.

Arkless added that the reason for the strict immigration policies is that politicians do not get reelected by encouraging immigration. The anti-immigration argument has been that immigrants only come to Western Europe to take advantage of its generous social benefits. What they do not see, however, is that immigrants are actually needed in the active labor force to keep the welfare systems afloat.

Lisa Anderson, dean of the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, points out those so far European voters are reluctant to embrace either of the two options that could help hamper the effects of population aging and therefore bolster the EU’s economic might in the world: more liberal immigration rules and Turkey’s membership in the European Union.

One significance of Turkey’s membership in the EU is that it expected to increase its numbers of skilled workers over the next two decades, so is another nearby country, Egypt. Turkey and Egypt could be the new labor pool of Europe in the next two decades. If Turkey becomes a member of EU, the region will benefit much from Turkey’s manpower but until today, the EU has been giving a lot of conditions, giving the impression that it is not ready to fully accept Turkey as its member.

Countries in the European Union have already benefited from opening their borders to migrants from neighboring countries since it is the first region in the world to have created an international zone in which labor is allowed to move freely. However, the EU must be willing to take further steps to loosen its immigration policies.

This also resonates true to other regions in the world like Asia in order to have a freer movement of labor. The conundrum in an increasingly globalized world is that while the advance of the market economy has led to a gradual liberalization of goods and capital, the movement of labor has remained restricted.

One sector that would benefit much from less strict immigration policies is the health care sector. Today, we are already seeing caregivers, nurses, doctors and other health workers migrating and working in aging populations like Canada and the U.K. In the future, we will also be seeing a freer movement of older people in countries who can offer cheaper yet quality health care like the Philippines.

Another factor affected by population aging is the relationship between states. In Korea for example, North Korea might be a crucial factor in drawing a demographic picture for the future of both South and North Korea. Changes in North-South relations would alter the population situation including labor market conditions in both countries. It is important therefore for both countries to consider improving their relationship since both are already experiencing rapid population aging especially in their workforce.

China’s relationship with other countries is also changing. Japan’s power as an economic giant in Asia is now shifting to China because of rapid population aging. Although China’s population is also aging, it will still benefit from its huge population for several decades and will continue to do so if it does efforts to curb population aging.

To reverse the process of population aging, there is a need for state policies that would encourage more child births by giving incentives. One factor in the increasing number of children in France is its generous social legislation. Women are giving long maternity leaves, with assured return to work with posts and seniority intact. France also has a 35-hour workweek. Some say this is the reason why the French have so much leisure now that they have found nothing more interesting to do with it than have babies, combining fun with demographic patriotism. In Germany allowances for parents has been introduced to encourage child birth. Britain has introduced the same measure in 2001 and last year Britain had its highest birthrate in the last 13 years.

Conclusion

Age is one of the most important demographic variables in development planning. It provides the basis for estimating the school-going age, the dependent population, the employable population and the elderly. Because of this, population aging and its impacts on labor and economy, social security and pension system, health care system, migration and the relationship between states cannot just be ignored. There is a need therefore to change the way we do things in the national, regional and international level.

The responsibility of taking care of the elderly has already shifted from the family to the state or society. On the national level, various nations will be increasingly concerned with old-age policy. Efforts to hold down the cost of health care and pensions for the elderly are not likely to be successful as the aged population expands. Instead, states will more or less be required to expand and improve their health and social services for old people. States must be able to come up with methods to increase revenues significantly in order to support the growing number of aged because although the elderly are headed toward a more positive life situation in the future, as compared with past generations of old people, their large numbers will require considerably more resources than previously. Aging states must also change their population policies to correct this demographic trend.

In the regional level, there must be increased coordination and cooperation in terms of labor migration and health care services. Changing how people view immigrants is very important because right now some individuals think that immigrants would only like to take advantage of the “good life” in welfare states. Removing biases like this may be the only way to save their economies.

In the international level, there is a need to raise awareness on the issue of population aging and its impacts. It becomes an international issue because it changes the course of the relationship between states and how the concept of citizenship is viewed.

On the individual level, there is a need for us to change how we view elderly people from being a totally dependent population to being productive as well. Older people today are markedly different from the aged of previous generations. They are more healthy, alert, vigorous, and younger in outlook. They are also better educated and more affluent than in the past. In modern societies, it is typically only after the age of 75 that most people begin to decline physically. Some decline mentally while others remain relatively healthy past the age of 75.

Because of these factors and their large numbers the elderly can now have increased political power and influence. This means that they will have the clout to bring about legislation for public services to meet their needs.

Finally, the consequences of population aging may not yet be widely felt in developing countries like the Philippines but patterns are already showing a shift towards aging especially because a number of our working population are choosing to work abroad. Thus, we must be well-informed ready to take on the challenges of population aging in the future.

Bibliography
Bennhold, Katrin. January 25, 2007 “Europe faces labor shortages as population ages.” International Herald Tribune.

Burroughes, Tom. December 18, 2006 “Growing life spans pose a challenge for British pension funds.” International Herald Tribune.

Cockerham, William C. 1991. This Aging Society. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Feranil, Imelda Z. 1983 “The Changing Age and Sex Structure,” in Population of the Philippines: Current Perspectives and Future Perspectives, edited by M.B. Concepcion. Manila: Neda/PDPR.

Gavrilov, Leonid A. and Heuveline, Patrick. 2003 “Aging of Population.” In The Encyclopedia of Population, edited by Paul Demeny and Geoffrey McNicoll. New York: MacMillan Reference USA.
Heisel, Donald. 2002 “Could international migration make up for declining and aging populations?.” Migration World Magazine; 30, 1/ 2.

Kwon, Tai-Hwan. April 2003 “Demographic Trends and Their Social Implications.” Social Indicators Research; 62,1.

Pfaff, William. January 29, 2007 “A new French exception? Having more babies.” International Herald Tribune
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Seetharam, K.S. Summer/Fall 2003 “Population, Society, and Power,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs; 4, 2.

The Associated Press. January 20, 2007 “As population declines, Japan considers importing foreign workers—then thinks again.” International Herald Tribune.

The Associated Press. January 29, 2007 “Japanese woman identified as world’s oldest person, has lived through 4 emperors.” International Herald Tribune.

Weers, John. 1992 “Age and Sex Structure,” in Population: An Introduction to Concepts and Issues, 5th ed. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company.

Zablan, Zelda. 9-11 June 1989 “The Philippine Demographic Transition: Implications for National Development and Identity”, paper read during International Conference, 1989 and the World: Actors and Contexts, Transitions and Transformation. UP Population Institute.

http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/ageing/ageing2006table.xls

Joseph E. Stiglitz’ book Globalization and its Discontents works at the premise that globalization is not an inherently evil concept. However, it is the management of globalization by international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO), that has produced discontents particularly from developing countries.

Stiglitz acknowledges that globalization does have its benefits. He argues that international trade has helped many economies to grow far more quickly than they would have otherwise done without joining the global market. He also stated that globalization has allowed people to live longer and to have better standards of living. Another benefit brought to us by globalization, Stiglitz says, is the increasing access to knowledge. This is particularly beneficial to people from developing countries whose increasing access to information technology has allowed them to become more in tuned with the rest of the world.

Stiglitz focused his analysis on the three main institutions that govern globalization, particularly economic globalization: the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO. According to him, these institutions use the ‘Washington Consensus’ as their blueprint for making policies. The Washington Consensus cites three pillars that should be present in economies to be able to assimilate into the global market– fiscal austerity, privatization and market liberalization. The IMF, for example, provides funds only if countries engage in policies like cutting deficits, raising taxes and raising interest rates. Stiglitz noted that these three pillars produce adverse effects to developing economies if there is a lack of proper management.

Using the East Asian financial crisis of 1998 and Russia’s transition from a communist to a capitalist and globalist economy, Stiglitz described how the IMF’s policies and conditionalities have actually worsened their situation. In East Asia, for example, the rapid capital market liberalization and the influx of short-term loans have been cited as the most important causes of crisis. Russia, on the other hand, has been encouraged by the IMF to open its doors to free capital flow without even having stable financial institutions yet. For many economists, including Stiglitz, this rush to open its doors to globalization has resulted to the Russian economy’s downfall.

Despite Stiglitz criticisms against globalization and its managers, he states that we cannot ignore globalization and that it is here to stay. Although he is pessimistic that institutions such as the IMF can abruptly change its loan policies and how it manages globalization, Stiglitz cites several prescriptions in order for globalization to work, not only for the rich developed countries but more so, for the poor developing ones.

His prescriptions include interventions through tax systems like exit taxes to counter the adverse effects of short-term capital flows. Another recommendation is to allow borrowers who cannot pay creditors to file bankruptcy rather than relying on IMF-financed bailouts. This will decrease the reliance on bailouts, which Stiglitz noted, often fail to work positively for the borrower. Stiglitz also cited the need for improvements in banking regulations, risk management, safety nets and crises responses.

All throughout the book, the author argues that international economic institutions must lessen their focus on macroeconomic factors such as inflation and must shift their attention to factors such as unemployment and poverty. Economies must therefore know the expected poverty and unemployment impacts of IMF programs before adapting them.

II. Review

The author, Joseph E. Stiglitz, used his own experiences as a Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers under former United States President Bill Clinton and chief economist at the World Bank to write this book about the shortfalls of globalization. His experiences give credibility to the author since he was once a part of the institutions he writes about.

The author can be credited for his knowledge about the real deals in the policy-making process at the IMF and World Bank. His inside stories about the cases of African developing countries like Ethiopia and Botswana and East Asian countries Thailand and South Korea were written like exposes about how the IMF pushed its agenda.

However, as Stiglitz pointed out, most of the transactions between the IMF and the countries to which it doles out money are often made in closed-door meetings and in utmost secrecy. This means that Stiglitz himself is not privy to the minutes of the meetings and how policies are agreed upon.

As a researcher, the challenge is to look for other sources that would say developing countries are actually forced to sign agreements with the IMF and agree with the conditionalities that come with the loans. Common sense would perhaps dictate that this is what is actually happening. However, as a scholar, there lies a bigger challenge to prove accusations such as blackmailing.

The author used individual cases in this book, particularly the experiences during the East Asian financial crisis and the Russian assimilation into the global market. Stiglitz used a micro perspective in his analysis of globalization and its discontents compared to other scholars who use macro perspectives in their studies.

The use of anecdotal evidences gives a fresh view of how institutions work in real settings. One particularly striking anecdote in the book was how the World Bank representatives did their reports before actually visiting a client country. According to Stiglitz, the common practice was to write a draft report wherein paragraphs are usually lifted from previous draft reports.

The book pinpoints that it is the inappropriate governance of globalization by international institutions that has hampered the developing economies from enjoying the benefits of a global market. Even staunch defenders of globalization recognize this and see that there really is a need for the IMF to modify its policies depending on the background of the client country.

Jagdish Bhagwati, a noted economist and defender of globalization who wrote the book In Defense of Globalization, noted that capital market liberalization, one of the pillars of economic globalization pushed by the IMF, is a dangerous thing. Both Stiglitz and Bhagwati agree that capital outflows triggered the East Asian financial crisis in 1998.

While Stiglitz focused on the shortfalls of international institutions, he sometimes failed to consider in the cases mentioned, the reforms needed in domestic institutions like the government, domestic laws and local banking institutions so that globalization can work better.

This gives an impression that globalization makes domestic institutions prisoners to the IMF’s whims, underestimating the role of states to protect their own economies. If as Stiglitz mentioned, countries like China and even a developing country like Malaysia are able to protect their own economies by not adhering to every IMF policy, then other economies can also have their way. But first, reforms must be made in the local institutions. One thing would be fighting off corruption so as to create a stable environment for investors. Another thing would be as the author suggested, creating exit taxes to lessen the burden of rapid capital outflows.

Another point mentioned in the book was the underlying problem of who decides what international economic institutions do. Stiglitz noted that it is often the top economists and the finance and trade managers of states who are sent as representatives at the WTO or in dealings with the IMF and World Bank. It is therefore normal for these individuals to represent the interests of investors or even creditors rather than the general welfare of their people. Stiglitz even went on to say that these representatives are conscious of their actions as finance or trade managers so as not to offend their future employers when they do decide to leave public service. In essence, the argument is correct. We see a lot of these managers going from public service to private corporations. However, we cannot fault them for doing so and we cannot blame the government for hiring the best economists or people from the private sector since more often than not, they are the ones who know best how the international economic institutions work.

A solution to this problem would be more transparency in the dealings with international institutions. One cannot condemn a trade manager just because s/he is an economist or a finance expert. The public should be able to judge whether the manager is doing his or her job of protecting the country’s economy or if s/he is more adept at protecting his or her own selfish interests. More transparency also means greater responsibility for the international institutions to come up with fair deals.

Perhaps, Stiglitz’ most important recommendation to improve globalization is the shifting of focus from macroeconomics to microeconomics. Unemployment and poverty rates often take the backseat when economic stability is at stake but as Stiglitz mentioned in this book, these factors, when taken for granted, often cause instability in the political stream and therefore in the flow of investments. He made a good point here, criticizing the IMF policies as often simplistic solutions to complicated problems.

Overall, Stiglitz strength lies on his experiences while inside the system and the good thing about his book is that focuses on his specific critiques to globalization processes as opposed to stake-wielding groups who would rather make sweeping condemnation against globalization.

III. Recommendations

The book was particularly focused on institutions linked to globalization and not on globalization per se. The discontents discussed referred more to the failures of the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO. But there are also other discontents that are not economic in nature. Globalization discontents also include cultural and social degradation. It would have been interesting also to include these topics in the book aside from the economic side of globalization and see how the author views these discontents.

Another thing that was lacking in the book is that there was not much mention on previous works or studies related to globalization, poverty or unemployment. In Bhagwati’s work, there were several references to scholarly works that helped to prove his arguments. Aside from the anecdotes from Stiglitz, it would have been also helpful to cite some previous works done by scholars.

Lastly, while it was good that Stiglitz had a keen eye in pinpointing the international institutions’ shortfalls and he provided recommendations on how to improve the management of globalization, it would also be helpful for states to know what should be reformed in the local level– what local economies are doing wrong now and how to improve the local system in order to reap the benefits of a global world.

The authors, Aphrodicio and Eleanor Laquian both served Erap in his short tint as president. Estrada appointed Aphrodicio Laquian as his chief of staff while Eleanor Laquian also helped in the internal management of a small unit in Malacañang called TOP or The Office of the President. The Laquians only stayed in what they described as the “snake pit” for merely six weeks from February to March 2000. Their appointment was racked with intrigues because of the internal politics inside Malacañang. Erap was reportedly angered after Laquian joked about how Erap’s midnight cabinet made important decisions for the country. The midnight cabinet referred to was Erap’s late night drinking buddies. On March 24, 2000, the Laquians went back to Canada after an embarrassing and well publicized falling out with the president.

The book is a product of the authors’ personal experiences inside Malacañang, their personal interaction and relationship with Estrada and their knowledge of the political system. The thesis of this book was presented by its authors in the first chapter.

“Our primary thesis in this book is that, despite his many personal flaws, the tragic end of the Estrada presidency cannot be blamed on the president’s personal traits and individual characteristics alone. Rather, what happened to the Estrada presidency should be seen in the total contexts of the Philippine political culture. We propose that in this case, President Estrada should be seen as a typical Filipino, embodying in his persona many characteristics that make the Filipinos what they are.”

The first part of the book narrates the series of events and controversies surrounding the Estrada presidency, which eventually led to its downfall. The authors described the Philippine political system as a “pragmatic” political system where “each political group pushes its own ends but enunciates these as manifestations of public good.” Certain characteristics of the Philippine society led to this kind of politics, particularly cited in the book was the huge gap between the rich and the poor that produced “functionalism and the tayo-tayo principle.”

The second chapter is an in depth look at the impeachment trial of Estrada and the events that followed leading to EDSA. The impeachment trial as discussed has always been a political and not a judicial trial, with particular emphasis on it being a numbers game and the particular strategies made by the prosecution and defense panels. The authors believe that the impeachment trial damaged the institution of the presidency and the legislature, the Senate in particular, since the chamber did not even have the appropriate rules for the trial and the senators were perceived to be voting for their own personal interests. The judiciary, on the other hand, gained positive review for Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide’s impartial handling of the trial. The authors shared the idea of other political analysts that the events following the trial showed the fragility of our democratic institutions.

“In contrast, the tumultuous events that followed the ’second envelope vote’ in the Senate impeachment trial revealed the fragile nature of democracy in the Philippines.”

The next chapter is a historical and behavioral look at the Philippine presidency, from the time of the first Philippine president Emilio Aguinaldo to Estrada’s administration as the 13th president of the Republic. It also provides an economic and cultural context to explain the Philippine political behavior through the years, similar to what was described by the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism in their study about the Philippine legislature, published in the book Rulemakers. Like our legislators, the president is also seen as behaving in the context of the Philippine culture s/he grew up with.

The fourth chapter is a look at Estrada’s personality seen through the eyes of the authors as well as other family members and friends. A lot of interesting anecdotes were used to establish the fact that Erap was not as evil as he was portrayed in the controversies that surrounded his presidency. For the readers, this is something new, to see Estrada in a different light as professed by people who knew him well. The transformation of Estrada from a rebellious kid to an actor and politician and to his short stint as president was well documented by the authors. Despite the negative experience from their relationship with Estrada, the Laquians really believed that he was not evil.

“After carefully analyzing the president’s persona, especially in the light of the circumstances that led to his impeachment and downfall, we have concluded that Erap was not a bad man. We truly believed that he was sincere in his desire to help the poor. As we often said during the 1998 presidential campaign, his heart was in the right place.”

Chapter 5 documents the first one hundred days of Erap as president and his appointments for key positions in the Cabinet. The authors described clearly how Erap was greatly influenced by his so-called friends and allies in politics. The authors are of the opinion that Estrada did not use his power to appoint persons in the Cabinet wisely and he did not have a clear legislative agenda. In this chapter, the Laquians narrated how they were offered positions in Malacañang by Estrada, the spoils given them and the tension between them and the other officials inside the Palace. It was evident that everyone wanted to be close to the president because of the power and influence that came with it. The authors were critical of the wrong practices in the Palace done by the people who ran it . Being inside the system then proved to be an advantage to the Laquians for they were able to observe closely how Malacañang was really ran by the people close to the president.

The next chapter identified the people behind President Estrada, his political and business allies, the technocrats and his close friends, the who’s who in the executive department. This book is perhaps a first of its kind since it accounts the important people behind the president’s decisions. Again, the Laquians used their own knowledge and observations in writing this chapter, even describing who gets who from the president and what the president gets in return for the favors.

Chapter 7 is all about the role of the armed forces in the ouster of President Estrada. Estrada is portrayed as someone brash and undisciplined contrary to the well-disciplined nature of the military. He was heavily criticized for his lack of knowledge in history and apparent lack of sensitivity to the Islamic culture as seen in his decision to an all out war against the Moro insurgency in Mindanao. The authors provided some anecdotes from their dialogues with Erap and it showed the President’s level of understanding of the insurgency problem. This chapter also discussed the role of the heavily politicized military to the uprisings in EDSA People Power 1 and 2. The withdrawal of support by the military as the main stabilizer in Philippine politics was evident in these two events.

The next chapter described the relationship of the President to various sectors of society—the masses, the political, business and political elites, the left, the media and the middle class. It showed how the dynamics of his relationship with these sectors have greatly influenced his eventual ouster from office.

A separate chapter discussed the contribution of civil society to the uprising in EDSA including the various people’s organizations, the left and the Church. The final chapter provides an analysis of what the Estrada experience has brought to Philippine politics. Because of the revolving door policies of the Macapagal-Arroyo administration, the authors concluded that nothing much has changed in Philippine politics after EDSA 2.

“The same patterns of political accommodation of those who helped Macapagal-Arroyo attain the presidency are becoming apparent. Former President Fidel Ramos has been appointed envoy extraordinary, back to indulging in his favorite foreign travels at public expense. Former Speaker Jose De Venecia is poised to return to the House of Representatives and reclaim leadership..”

The authors used both a functional/behavioral approach and a systems approach in their analysis of Erap’s failed presidency. Because they were close to Estrada, it was easy for them to study his personal and work behavior that influenced his decisions. Estrada had a personal management style and this was aptly explained in the book. He was a person who valued his family and friends more than anything so it was easy to understand the way he acted and why most of his actions favored his friends and family. These revelations wouldn’t be possible if the author did not know his or her subject well enough and for that, the authors must be credited for studying their subject well.

On the other hand, knowing the subject too well may become a problem for other readers since the credibility and biases of the authors may be in question. In this case, the Laquians used to be friends with Estrada until he removed Prod Laquian as his chief of staff after he latter’s confessions about the President’s midnight cabinet. For some readers, the revelations in this book may look like something Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson would say. Singson admitted that he testified about the jueteng payoffs against former friend Erap because he was furious when the Bingo 2 Ball franchise in Northern Luzon was not awarded to him. For this, some would probably question the credibility of the accounts told in this book so it is a challenge for the authors to find sources other than themselves to prove their point.

The anecdotes from people close to Estrada is also important in writing if one is to capture the personality of the subject. It is an advantage for the Laquians that they knew the Estrada family well and this adds to the credibility of their story. The strength of this book really is the fact that most of its inputs come from the first hand experiences of its authors and the analysis comes from an insider perspective.

Using a systems approach, the book tries to paint a whollistic picture of the Estrada presidency, knowing that the political system does not exist in a vacuum. It does not take for granted the fact that Philippine politics is a product of a unique Philippine culture and that the political system exists in its own unique environment.

“Philippine society is an Oriental one, it reflects an indigenous Asian culture. Thus, political events in the Philippines, such as the tragic end of the Estrada presidency can only be properly understood in the specific context of Philippine society.”

The authors were careful to discuss the contributing factors to the political system, i.e., the political and economic environment, the various actors in Estrada’s ouster like the civil society, the military, politicians, media, the Church and other leaders. There was enough research put into identifying and explaining these variables. Aphrodicio Laquian’s background as a political scientist, contributed to this better understanding of the political system.

Another strong point of the book is its analysis of the implications of the Erap experience to the present system, as discussed in the final chapter. It explains the lessons from the Erap presidency and its long term effect to the political development of the country. This is a good ending for the book for it provides options for the development of Philippine democracy as noted in its conclusion.

“This means that Macapagal-Arroyo and her supporters should refrain from engaging in corrupt activities that will be too obvious to an alert and militant citizenry. They should pursue genuine pro-poor policies and programs and not rely on spin doctoring and propaganda like the Erap administration. They should promise little and deliver a lot. If they are able to do this, the prospects for economic and political development in the Philippines for the next decade will be bright indeed.”

The book was written in a popular and readable style, even including Erap jokes from text messages and e-mails. It appeals to the intrigue hungry audience, who long wanted to know what the Laquians think of what happened to Erap since their falling out with the deposed president.

On the other hand, one weakness of this book is that it lacked consistency in its tone of writing. There is an effort to make it appealing to a mass audience, thus, the use of insightful and interesting anecdotes, text messages and e-mails. However, this was not consistent in the whole book, as shown in the latter chapters of the book when the tone shifted to a more academic discussion. There is also the tendency to shift points of view. Because this is a first-hand experience, the authors used the first person point of view in some paragraphs but again there was also the problem with consistency.

Another weakness of this book is its tendency to discuss more than what is required for a certain related topic. The authors should be credited for giving background information but sometimes the tendency with giving too much information on various topics is that you lose your readers’ attention and you tend to veer away from the original thesis of the book. Perhaps, the authors did this because the book is really catered for an international audience. A lot of discussion may be good material for another book. It would have been more interesting though if the authors wrote more about their observations inside the ’snake pit.’

I also noticed a factual error in the book. When it discussed the role of the Church to the Erap ouster, the authors identified the El Shaddai as a born again charismatic movement. The El Shaddai, although led by a lay person Bro. Mike Velarde, is still identified with the Roman Catholic Church and is under its supervision.

Despite a few setbacks, this book has achieved its goal to provide an insider perspective of what happened to Estrada. A lot has already been written and said about Estrada and his ouster but this book is unique and fresh in the sense that the authors have their own stories to tell the public about Erap. The authors are quick to clarify that the stories they revealed in the book is not a way to get back at Estrada. There was that challenge for its writers not to be affected by their own biases in making their analysis.

“The book is not a disclosure of the wrongdoings of Estrada to settle old scores nor an apologia for his personal shortcomings that damaged his leadership. Rather, it explains how Erap struggled with the exercise of power. It places Erap’s presidency in the context of Philippine political history and Filipino values and culture. It explores the implications of Erap’s removal from office on the prospects for economic development and democracy in the Philippines. The strength of the book likes in its inside stories about life in the Malacañang ‘Snake Pit’ and the author’s analysis of the events from their unique insider/outsider perspective.”

Aside from its analysis of the Erap presidency, this book has also allowed its readers to take a peek at Malacañang as an institution and the internal politics inside what the authors called the ’snake pit.’

The increasingly globalized world can be credited to the information revolution made possible by information and communication technologies (ICTs). We have heard incessantly about the benefits brought by these new technologies on the way we do things and the manner in which we communicate.

Critics of globalization are quick to point out, however, that a so-called digital divide exists between the developed and underdeveloped countries. The latter are portrayed to be playing catch-up in order to reap the benefits of new technology.

This paper looks at the digital divide within the member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the efforts being made to bridge the gap and how underdeveloped countries can move even closer to closing the gap.

DIGITAL DIVIDE AND THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY

The concept of digital divide is often simply defined as “the gap between those who have access to the new information and communications technology and those [without].”

For some scholars, the digital divide is only a symptom of other divides like income, development and literacy. The Economist reports that fewer people in poor countries own computers and have access to the Internet rather than people in developed countries because they are too poor, illiterate or have more pressing concerns such as food, health care, security and other basic needs.

Political scientist Pippa Norris saw this ‘global divide’ as a multi-dimensional phenomenon encompassing three different aspects.

“The global divide refers to the divergence of Internet access between industrialized and developing societies. The social divide concerns the gap between information rich and poor in each nation. And lastly within the online community, the democratic divide signifies the difference between those who do, and do not, use the panoply of digital resources to engage, mobilize and participate in public life.”

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), in its 1999 report, warned that the new information and communication technologies might “widen the gap between the affluent nations and those lacking the resources, skills and infrastructure.” (UNDP, 1999)

But what is the whole big deal about the digital divide? Efforts to bridge the gap are being made because ICT is believed to have a “leapfrogging” characteristic that will enable poor states to catch up on their rich counterparts economically.

This belief can be traced to a worldwide acknowledgment of the importance of knowledge as a resource. As the book Breaking the Digital Divide suggests:

“Above all, the Internet can become a crucial channel for the diffusion of essential information in those places where poverty implies not only lack of economic means but also lack of accurate information.”

Knowledge is now regarded as the main driving force for innovation and development. Hans-Dieter Ever and Solvay Gerke, in their study about the digital divide in the ASEAN region, saw that knowledge explains the gap between the developed and underdeveloped, between poor and rich countries, between Singapore and Laos or Malaysia and Indonesia. This knowledge gap refers to the “uneven intensity of knowledge production, availability and dissemination worldwide.”

The ASEAN is giving utmost attention to this new knowledge economy. During the first ASEAN Telecommunications Ministers (TELMIN) meeting in July 2001 held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, then Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad highlighted in his keynote address that ICT is responsible for shaping a new kind of economy, where knowledge and information is the prime mover of productivity and economic performance. He says the shift to a knowledge-based economy offers significant potential for the ASEAN region to achieve and maintain sustainable economic growth and competitiveness.

To a large extent, the digital divide determines the capacity of producing and using new knowledge. Computers are known to augment and improve thinking capabilities of individuals and organizations to enhance their efficiency. The spread of personal computers and the Internet has connected millions of people to the knowledge resources of the World Wide Web.

Thus, several Southeast Asian countries have planned and carried out strategies to bridge the digital divide and close the knowledge gap between them and the OECD countries.

Next, we shall look at the current status of ICT development in the ASEAN region with particular focus on the ICT indicators such as telephone lines, mobile phones and Internet access.

DIGITAL DIVIDE IN THE ASEAN

Indicators of ICT diffusion in an economy include usage of televisions, personal computers, main telephone lines, mobile phones, fax machines, and Internet.

TABLE 1
Source: 2006 World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators, International Telecommunication Union

Country in the ASEAN region

Main Telephone Lines per 100 inhabitants
Brunei Darussalam
20.99
Cambodia
0.23
Indonesia
6.57
Laos
1.27
Malaysia
16.83
Myanmar
0.93
Philippines
4.00
Singapore
42.32
Thailand
10.92
Vietnam
18.81

Table 1 shows the diffusion of telephone lines in the ASEAN region as of 2006. As expected, there is still a large disparity between the number of telephone lines per 100 inhabitants in the more developed countries such as Singapore and Brunei and the less developed countries such as Cambodia and Myanmar.

There is, however, a reason to be optimistic because statistics from the previous years show that the growth rate in the number of main telephones is highest in the emergent economies of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.

TABLE 2
Source: 2006 World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators, International Telecommunication Union

Country in the ASEAN region

Cellular mobile subscribers per 100 inhabitants
Brunei Darussalam
66.51
Cambodia
7.94
Indonesia
28.30
Laos
10.77
Malaysia
75.45
Myanmar
0.42
Philippines
49.24
Singapore
109.34
Thailand
63.02
Vietnam
18.17

Table 2 shows the spread of mobile phones in the region as of 2006. The numbers indicate lesser disparity between countries except for Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam.

Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia post the highest growth rates in the number of mobile phones in the past years. This reflects a preference for cellular telephone services because landline phone networks are difficult to obtain in these wide-area countries.

In the Philippines, for example, before the advent of mobile phones in the early 90s and the deregulation of the telecommunications industry, there were only 1.37 million landlines serving about 62 million Filipinos nationwide. The waiting time for a phone line to be installed was two to six months and the ruling Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company had a backlog of almost 800,000 lines.

Fernando Paragas, a Communications Research professor at the College of Mass Communication in the University of the Philippines made a study about the digital divide in the Philippines. He saw that his respondents considered mobile phones as possible substitute for fixed telephone lines for their telecommunication needs because of cost and access considerations.

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) notes that when income is controlled, the use of cellphones and televisions appears to increase with the rise of population. This may be because the technology is simpler and they are easily available for purchase in most countries.

Obviously, mobile phones account for a significant portion of the ASEAN region’s total phone lines. The number of mobile phone subscribers in the region continues to grow and will therefore play an important role in bridging the digital divide.

TABLE 3
Source: 2006 World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators, International Telecommunication Union

Country in the ASEAN region
Internet Users per 100 inhabitants
Brunei Darussalam
43.35
Cambodia
0.31
Indonesia
7.18
Laos
0.42
Malaysia
43.77
Myanmar
0.18
Philippines
5.48
Singapore
39.21
Thailand
13.07
Vietnam
17.21

In 2000, only 1% or 3.2 million of the 300 million people connected to the Internet are in Southeast Asia. Today, Internet access continues to be a problem in most ASEAN countries. This may be because of high costs of access due to the technology required.

This is an unfortunate situation because for most Asian netizens, the Internet has become an alternative medium for views and news that would otherwise remain unheard and unwritten. It has enabled new voices to be heard and has engendered new practices. Thus, some ASEAN governments like Singapore have sought to initially control the Internet via ‘mainstream’ broadcasting legislative and regulative measures but later on saw that traditional control measures are largely ineffective.

The principal factors for the diffusion of ICT are income and investments in human resource and infrastructure development. Therefore, in order to bridge the gap, there have been efforts to focus on these factors which will be discussed next.

BRIDGING THE DIGITAL DIVIDE

The ASEAN has made significant efforts to push for relevant policies and institutions that will see through the diffusion of ICTs especially among member countries that are lagging behind. One of these efforts is the forging of the e-ASEAN Framework Agreement in November 2000 that set four objectives, including reducing the digital divide within and among member countries by improving their national information infrastructure.

As a result, the ASEAN Telecommunication and IT Ministers’ Meeting (TELMIN) was inaugurated in July 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The TELMIN meets once a year, during which the Ministers hold a dialogue among themselves. During the first TELMIN, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammand urged the group to give priority to accessibility by “narrowing the digital divide, development of skills and expertise, promote and enhance the use of ICT, development of local and regional content for the ASEAN region and ensuring a well-coordinated network security.”

When TELMIN was formed, a corresponding body called the ASEAN Telecommunication Senior Officials’ Meeting (TELSOM) was also established to assist the work of TELMIN. TELSOM acts as the coordinating arm of TELMIN. It comprises senior telecommunications officials duly designated from each of the ten ASEAN member countries and meets at least once a year.

During the first TELSOM hosted by the Ministry of Communications of Brunei Darussalam, it was agreed that TELMIN and TELSOM would serve as platforms in “responding to the ASEAN Vision 2020 and the Hanoi Plan of Action to achieve interoperability and interconnectivity of National Information Infrastructure of member states by the year 2010, develop and implement an ASEAN Plan of Action on Regional Broadband Interconnectivity and intensify cooperation in ensuring seamless roaming telecommunications services within the region as well as in facilitating intra-ASEAN trade in telecommunications equipment and services.”

An example of a TELMIN program are the sessions featuring ASEAN youths to enable the Ministers to actively connect with younger ASEAN members and exchange views on how ICT affects the lives of the youth and how the youth see the future of ICT in the ASEAN region.

Prior to the TELMIN and TELSOM, the ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting (AEM) and ASEAN Senior Economic Officials Meeting (SEOM) were in charge of looking after telecommunications and IT matters within the region. Creating distinct institutions within the regional organization tells us how important ICT is viewed in the development of ASEAN countries.

Another institution, the ASEAN Telecommunication Regulators’ Council (ATRC) was formed in July 1995 in Jakarta, Indonesia. The ATRC was tasked to provide the telecommunications regulators and authorities within the region the opportunity to work together in the spirit of cooperation and action. Its main goal is to be able to set standards in the telecommunications industry within the region to give way for market integration.

So what has been achieved by these institutions so far? The 2nd TELMIN meeting held in Manila in 2002 reports that ASEAN countries have been establishing bodies to handle ICT matters or creating new units in the telecommunications ministries for that purpose. At the end of their meeting, the ministers issued the Manila Declaration 2002 expressing their “determination to develop ASEAN’s ICT human resources, involve the private sector in working out sustainable international charging arrangements for Internet services, set up an ASEAN network security coordinating council, and accelerate the ASEAN information infrastructure program.”

During the 3rd TELMIN held in Singapore, the ASEAN ministers endorsed initiatives to advance ICT market integration and trade facilitation, promote universal access to ICT infrastructure and services, and develop ICT skills and competencies. In relation to market integration, the group agreed to expedite the implementation of Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRA) on conformity assessment for telecommunication equipment, which will create standards for the industry. These arrangements were set to benefit consumers by making telecommunications equipment more affordable and accessible. Ministers also urged the ASEAN to consider project partnerships with dialogue partners and other international organizations.

The establishment of the ASEAN ICT fund was the highlight of the 4th TELMIN meeting held in Bangkok, Thailand. The fund was set to have an amount of USD5 million with equal contributions by all ASEAN members in line with the e-ASEAN Framework Agreement. The Fund was set to be used to accelerate the implementation of the ASEAN ICT Work Programme.

Since all these institutions were established, the ASEAN has taken the first step to bridge the digital divide by measuring the extent to which it is prevalent in the ASEAN countries. A public online digital divide database can be found in a website (www.aseanconnect.gov.my,) which houses key data statistics and measurement indicators and other information related to the digital divide within the ASEAN. However, the data in the site are not complete and the site is not updated regularly.

ASEANONE reports that generally, the ICT diffusion in the last five years is faster in low-income economies, which also have the worst penetration rates, than in high-income economies which have the best penetration rates.

For example, the growth rate of Internet users is most dramatic in Myanmar where Internet usage has not even reached 1 percent of the population, while slowest in Brunei where usage has already reached 10 percent.

In fixed telephone lines, Singapore’s penetration rate was 939 times of Cambodia’s in 1993, but only 177 times by 2003. Similarly, Singapore’s mobile phone penetration was 1,396 times of Myanmar’s in 1998, but was reduced to 710 times of Myanmar’s by 2003. The declining differences in performance in the various ICT indicators are suggestive of catch-up. However, the gaps in performance are still significant.

GETTING THERE BUT NOT QUITE YET

As we have discussed, there has been significant progress in bridging the digital divide but a lot still has to be improved through combined efforts of individuals, states, the private sector and the ASEAN.

One such effort is to promote bottom-up development by promoting and expanding the use of mobile phones. In most developing countries, mobile telephones are easier to obtain than traditional fixed telephones. Mobile phones are convenient, relatively affordable and therefore easier to acquire. Its economic benefits are also evident in developing countries, reducing the transaction costs and the need to travel as well as broadening trade networks. Therefore, the movement of the Internet and Internet applications into mobile phone systems will have a tremendous technological implication for the developing countries.

Improvements in the education system will also help in bridging the gap. ADB notes that education is a strong complement to Internet use and if a country aspires to exploit in significant ways the opportunities offered by new ICT, particularly the creation of new industries, it needs to emphasize secondary and tertiary education.
Continuous training on the part of the workforce will also be beneficial. This responsibility should lie within the private sector but the government may induce firms to impart such training through various types of tax incentives.

If continued, efforts of the private sector, like providing cheap Internet access to remote areas, can help bridge the gap. One example of this is Smart Communications’ high speed wireless mobile internet vans. An internet café housed in a 40-foot container van, these mobile Internet vans have been set up in far flung areas such as Basco in Batanes, Ipil in Zamboanga, Bantayan Island in Cebu, Balangiga in Eastern Samar and Tandag in Surigao del Sur.
Other important roles that governments can play include creating telecommunication infrastructure especially in poorer countries, an example of which are “technology parks” that cater to the specific needs of the ICT industry, promoting the use of freeware and shareware packages and tools and encouraging innovation through research and development.

As discussed, organizations such as the ASEAN can also play a role in promoting the development of ICTs in less developed countries. These initiatives may include the creation of uniform standards through technical assistance and policy advice, deregulation of the ICT sector and offering necessary financial assistance to create basic infrastructure.

Aside from the technology imbalance, there is also a content gap like in terms of the number of websites created in developing countries, amount of local language content, and use of online content by key sectors. There is therefore a need to increase user activity to help reduce this content gap. One way is to bring in larger and more diverse sections of communities to discuss issues of common interests in online forums.

To summarize, Evers and Gerke note that competitive advantage can be gained through a combination of high investments in ICT and increased local knowledge production and dissemination.

CONCLUSION

Closing the digital divide and the knowledge gap is considered necessary towards economic development. It is however, not an easy task and there are some who actually think that the divide will always be there because developed countries capitalize on the developing countries’ efforts to catch up. This may be true but one thing is for sure, information and communication technologies are continuously changing our lives—how we think, communicate and work. We must therefore look at how these technologies can work to our benefit.

This may happen if developing countries can find means to balance the need for modern technology and the basic foundations for economic development. #

Murelli, E., Delgrossi, L. and Wo Okot-Uma, R. (2002). Breaking the Digital Divide, p. 3.
The Real Digital Divide, The Economist, 10 March 2005.
Norris, P. (2001). Digital Divide? Civic Engagement, Information Poverty and the Internet Worldwide, p.1.
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (1999) Human Development Report 1999: Globalisation with a Human Face, p. 63.
Murelli, E., Delgrossi, L. and Wo Okot-Uma, R. op.cit., p. 3.
Evers, H. and Gerke, S. (2004). Closing the Digital Divide: Southeast Asia’s Path towards a Knowledge Society, Paper delivered at the Centre for East Asian Studies public lecture series, p. 1-2.
Ibid, p. 6.
TELMIN. (2001). Joint press statement, First ASEAN Telecommunications Ministers Meeting.
Quibria, M.G., Ahmed, S., Tschang, T. and Reyes-Macasaquit, M. (2002). Digital Divide: Determinants and Policies with Special Reference to Asia, p. 1-2.
Ibid, p. 3.
Paragas, F. Telecommunications in the Philippines: Perspectives on the Digital Divide, p. 11.
Ibid.
Sebastian, A. Mobile Phones: Bridging the Divides in Philippine Society, Asian Institute of Management paper, p.2.
Quibria, M.G., Ahmed, S., Tschang, T. and Reyes-Macasaquit, M., op. cit., p. 5.
Romulo, R. (2000). Bridging the Digital Divide in Southeast Asia, International Herald Tribune, 24 November 2000.
Wong, L. (2002). The Internet, Politics and the Digital Divide in Asia, paper delivered at the 2002 International Conference on the Digital Divide: Technology and Politics in the Information Age, p. 12-13.
Is the ASEAN digital divide shrinking?, ASEANONE, December 2005.
TELMIN. (2001). Joint press statement, First ASEAN Telecommunications Ministers Meeting.
About TELSOM. (downloaded from http://www.aseanconnect.gov.my/)
Ibid.
About ATRC. (downloaded from http://www.aseanconnect.gov.my/)
TELMIN. (2002). Press Statement, 2nd ASEAN Telecommunications Ministers Meeting.
TELMIN. (2003). Joint Media Statement, 3rd ASEAN Telecommunications Ministers Meeting.
TELMIN. (2004). Joint Media Statement, 4th ASEAN Telecommunications Ministers Meeting.
ASEANONE, op.cit.
Quibria, M.G., Ahmed, S., Tschang, T. and Reyes-Macasaquit, M., op. cit., p. 2.
Ibid, p. 9-10.
Ibid.
Ibid, p. 14.
Rao, M. (2000). Struggling with the Digital Divide: Internet Infrastructure, Content, and Culture, OnTheInternet, October 2000.
Evers and Gerke, op.cit., p. 26.

SOURCES

Asuncion M. Sebastian. 2005. “Mobile Phones: Bridging the Divides in Philippine Society.” Makati City, Philippines: Asian Institute of Management.

Elena Murelli, Luna Delgrossi and Rogers Wo Okot-Uma. Breaking the Digital Divide (Commonwealth Secretariat: Sept. 1, 2002)

Fernando Paragas. Telecommunications in the Philippines: Perspectives on the Digital Divide.

Hans-Dieter Evers and Solvay Gerke. 2004. “Closing the Digital Divide: Southeast Asia’s Path towards a Knowledge Society”, Paper delivered at the Centre for East Asian Studies public lecture series (Lund University, Sweden: Center for East and South-East Asian Studies.)

Loong Wong. 2002. The Internet, Politics and the Digital Divide in Asia. A paper delivered at the 2002 International Conference on the Digital Divide: Technology and Politics in the Information Age.

Madanmohan Rao. “Struggling with the Digital Divide: Internet Infrastructure, Content, and Culture.” OnTheInternet, October 2000.

M.G. Quibria, Shamsun N. Ahmed, Ted Tschang and Mari-len Reyes-Macasaquit. 2002. Digital Divide: Determinants and Policies with Special Reference to Asia. (Asian Development Bank: October 2002).

Pippa Norris. Digital Divide? Civic Engagement, Information Poverty and the Internet Worldwide. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001)

Roberto Romulo.“Bridging the Digital Divide in Southeast Asia”, International Herald Tribune, 24 November 2000.

About TELMIN. (downloaded from http://www.aseanconnect.gov.my/)

About TELSOM. (downloaded from http://www.aseanconnect.gov.my/)

About ATRC. (downloaded from http://www.aseanconnect.gov.my/)

International Telecommunication Union. World Telecommunications Indicators. 2006.

International Telecommunication Union. “Mobile overtakes fixed: Implications for policy and regulation.” (downloaded from http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/ni/mobileovertakes/Resources/Mobileovertakes_Paper.pdf)

“Is the ASEAN digital divide shrinking?,” ASEANONE, December 2005.

Joint press statement, First ASEAN Telecommunications Ministers Meeting. 13-14 July 2001, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

Press Statement, 2nd ASEAN Telecommunications Ministers Meeting. 27-28 August 2002, Manila, Philippines.

Joint Media Statement, 3rd ASEAN Telecommunications Ministers Meeting. 19 September, Singapore.

TELMIN. (2004). Joint Media Statement, 4th ASEAN Telecommunications Ministers Meeting. 5 August 2004, Bangkok, Thailand.

“The Real Digital Divide.” The Economist (print edition). March 10, 2005.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 1999: Globalisation with a Human Face.

There is no question as to how mobile telephony i.e., the use of mobile phone technology, has changed the lives of millions of Filipinos.

Before the advent of mobile phones in the country in the early 90s and the deregulation of the telecommunications industry, there were only 1.37 million landlines serving about 62 million Filipinos nationwide. The waiting time for a phone line to be installed was two to six months and the ruling Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company had a backlog of almost 800,000 lines.[1]

The emergence of wireless technology in the country has since changed the way Filipinos communicate. It has also a posed a significant impact on our politics and economy.

For this particular study, the researcher focused on the effects of mobile telephony on the agricultural sector, particularly fish trading in the country.

The study was done using case studies of fish traders in Navotas fish port, where most fish and seafood vendors in Metro Manila markets get their goods.

Finally, the objective of this paper is to provide options for development, to improve the fish trading system by taking advantage of the mobile phone technology through what is called m-Government or mobile government.

TECHNOLOGY AS A TOOL

This paper uses the framework of Wanda Orlikowski and Suzanne Iacono who studied the different conceptualizations of information and communications technology (ICT).

This study focuses on ICT as a tool, “a relatively straightforward, unchanging, and discrete technical entity with the focus being on the impacts/effects of this independent variable on such outcomes as information processing, productivity, social relations, and labor substitution.”[2]

According to Orlikowski and Iacono, tool conceptualization is the “common, received wisdom about what technology is and means.”[3] Within this general approach, four distinct categories were identified: technology as a substitute for labor, technology as a tool to enhance productivity, technology as a way to alter or enhance information processing and technology as a tool to alter or enhance social relations.

Related literature on telecommunications and development asserts the role of telecommunications technology as a tool for productivity and labor substitution. For example, it replaces travel thus, making communications more efficient.

Jeffrey James in his study “Information technology, transaction costs and patterns of globalization in developing countries” suggests that mobile phones, like other ICTs, help the economy of developing countries by reducing transaction costs. Other studies, which will be discussed later, saw the increased productivity in small and medium scale industries in some African countries.

Mobile phones are also seen as tools for information processing. These devices “transform the information networks of their users, enabling new contacts rather than improving contact with existing ones.”[4]

An example of this function of mobile phones is when farmers or fishermen check the prices of goods in other markets and look for suppliers through their cellular phones.

Other studies suggest that the mobile phone’s portability, simplicity and affordability make it ideal for education initiatives in places where Internet connection is scarce.

Mobile telephony is also said to alter social relations. Other studies note the rising power of communities with mobile phones to share information with each other.

The next part of the paper focuses on the concept of digital divide and the real digital divide, looking at the impacts of mobile telephony in developing countries, particularly in African countries.

THE REAL DIGITAL DIVIDE

The concept of digital divide stems from the birth of the Internet, which has created a new culture and language. Some say that the Internet gave way to the “new illiterate,” i.e. those who have not learned how to use the information and communication technologies either because they are not readily available to them or because they lack education.

Digital divide may be described simply as “the gap between those who have access to the new information and communications technology and those [without].”[5] The book Breaking the Digital Divide suggests:

“Above all, the Internet can become a crucial channel for the diffusion of essential information in those places where poverty implies not only lack of economic means but also lack of accurate information.”[6]

Political scientist Pippa Norris studied the concept of digital divide as a multi-dimensional phenomenon encompassing three different aspects.

“The global divide refers to the divergence of Internet access between industrialized and developing societies. The social divide concerns the gap between information rich and poor in each nation. And lastly within the online community, the democratic divide signifies the difference between those who do, and do not, use the panoply of digital resources to engage, mobilize and participate in public life.”[7]

Some scholars propose, on the other hand, that this digital divide is not the real problem but only a symptom of other divides like income, development and literacy. According to The Economist, fewer people in poor countries own computers and have access to the Internet rather than people in developed countries because they are too poor, illiterate or have more pressing concerns such as food, health care, security and other basic needs.[8]

The UNESCO reports that most of the world’s population lacks basic access to a telephone line, let alone a computer, producing societies increasingly marginalized at the periphery of communication networks[9]

Scholars suggest that rather than trying to bridge the digital divide by bringing in more computers to developing countries, the more sensible thing to do is to determine how to use technology to promote bottom-up development, by promoting the use of mobile phones. The real digital divide that matters then is between those who have access to mobile network and those without.[10]

Statistics from the International Telecommunications Union show a considerable difference between the use of computers and mobile phones in the Philippines. In 2004, there were 3.6 million personal computers in the country or 4.6 computers per 100 individuals. Mobile phone subscribers on the other hand, numbered 33.09 million or 39.85 cellular phones per 100 individuals. Only 5 million Filipinos or six out of every 100 have access to the Internet while only half of the 6.7 million available landlines are subscribed. [11] Current projections say that more and more countries will continue to add mobile phone lines than landlines.

Why mobile phones? Mobile phones are seen as more convenient to have since there is no need to have a permanent supply of electricity and it can be easily used even by people who cannot read or write. Mobile phones are convenient, relatively affordable and therefore easier to acquire. Its economic benefits are also evident in developing countries, reducing the transaction costs and the need to travel as well as broadening trade networks.

“The greatest impact of mobile communications on access to communication services—in other words, increasing the number of people who are in reach of a telephone connection of any kind—can be seen in developing countries.” [Furthermore] “In countries where mobile communications constitute the primary form of access, increased exchange of information on trade or health services is contributing to development goals; in countries where people commonly use both fixed-line and mobile communications, the personalized trait of the mobile phone are changing social interaction.”[12]

In Kenya, farmers were always at the disadvantage because they used to lack information on the shifting prices in the agricultural market. They were exploited by middlemen because they could not make informed decisions on the best times and the right prices to sell their crops. To empower the farmers, ACDI/VOCA’s Kenya Maize Development Program, a project funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) partnered with the Kenya Agricultural Commodity Exchange to devise a system to deliver up-to-date market information.

Today, Kenyan farmers are able to access market information through text messages on their cellular phones or through an interactive voice response system on landlines. From here, they can get the latest information on agricultural commodities in several major market centers. The gathering of market information also allows farmers and traders to establish an average market price for their commodities, thus doing away with middlemen who take advantage of them. Average prices, offers to sell, bids to buy and extension messages are uploaded to the messaging service as often as thrice a day.[13]

The same text messaging system is used by Ugandan farmers to know the real price of their crops so as to avoid being cheated by dishonest middlemen. Ugandan farmers often complain that middlemen cheat them by offering just a small amount of the actual market price for their produce. Through a mobile messaging system, farmers are able to know within seconds the current price of maize at markets throughout the country.

This information is available through Foodnet, an organization which advocates “greater market efficiency and value added processing in the agricultural sector.” Foodnet employs people in Ugandan towns to find out the prices for their produce in the local market. They send this information once a week via fax to Foodnet’s office in Kampala and it is then uploaded onto the mobile phone network. Those who are interested can accesss this information through their mobile phones via Short Message Service (SMS). For example, you type the keyword ‘rice’ and send it to a phone number. A few seconds later, the information is sent back to your phone. Foodnet also makes available the price of coffee as traded in London and New York. [14]

Through this system, the farmers are at a better and stronger bargaining position and can even trasport the goods to the markets themselves instead of being at the mercy of the visiting buyer.[15]

Cellular phones in Uganda are also used for rural income generation. Grameen Foundation partnered with Mobile Telephone Network (MTN) Uganda and nine microfinance institutions to create MTN villagePhone. MTN villagePhone sells mobile phones to female entrepreneurs in local villages, who in turn sell time on the phone to others in their communities.[16]

Customers use the phones for varying purposes including communicating with family members, conducting business trasanctions, checking the prices of agricultural products throughout the country and even participating in call in radio programs to voice their opinions.[17] This ‘phone lady system’ not only provides income for the women but more importantly, offers affordable telecommunications access to rural areas since the locals cannot afford to buy their own mobile phones. A similar sytem is also being done in Bangladeshi villages.

There is much reason to think positive if we look at the digital divide as the gap between those with access to mobile phones and those without. Projectionists say that the gap is closing fast and a report from the World Bank notes that 77 percent of the world’s total population already lives within range of a mobile network.[18]

Next, we shall discuss briefly the development of mobile telephony in the Philippines and how it has affected our society, politics and economy as a whole.

MOBILE TELEPHONY IN THE PHILIPPINES

Before the liberalization of the telecommunications industry in the early 1990s, telecommunications in the country was dominated by the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT).

The wireless industry started with the launch of Mobiline in 1991, an analog-based cellular phone service owned by Pilipino Telephone Corporation (Piltel), a PLDT subsidiary. [19] The second company to provide cellular services was Express Telecommunications Co. (Extelcom), which was launched on the same year. Smart Communications (Smart) started operating in February 1994. These three providers offered analog services.

In 1993, Isla Communications, Inc. (Islacom) launched the first Global System for Mobile Communications