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Introduction

After the Cold war, some scholars saw that the rationalist model of explaining phenomena was inadequate. Miles Kahler explains that this “cognitive inadequacy” of rationalist models needs to be modified or even abandoned so as to include other matters such as emotion-laden issues of identity.[1]

Philip Tetlock and Charles McGuire, Jr. saw that policymakers in international politics had “limited capacity information processors” so they employ a simple strategy of understanding their own environment.[2] This strategy has challenged the primacy of rational choice in decision-making, thus constructivism was born.

Social constructivism, according to Kahler, puts emphasis on socially constructed identity in research. Decision-makers, policymakers or what constructivists call “agents,” are affected by his or her institutional environment.[3]

The basic premise of constructivism, according to Nicholas Onuf is that human beings are social beings and that we are ultimately defined by our social relations.

“Constructivism holds that people make society, and society makes people. This is a two-way process. Social rules, the third element, link the other two elements. Social rules make the process by which people and society constitute each other continuous and reciprocal.”[4]

This paper looks at the global war on terrorism as a war of norms, rules and institutions notwithstanding the interests of its lead agency, the United States of America. It also attempts to understand why states comply while others refuse to participate in the war.

Review of Related Literature

First, we shall review some of the important points of social constructivists and then later apply it in the context of international relations.

Anarchy, Order and the International Society

For Nicholas Onuf, anarchy does not mean an absence of rules but rather it is a condition wherein rules are not directly responsible for how agents conduct their relations. Simply put, rules and order have always been present in the international society.[5]

Hedley Bull, on the other hand, sees order as a part of the history of international relations since modern states have already formed a system of states and an international society. He gives further emphasis to the Grotian tradition, which posits that states are not engaged in a simple struggle or conflict but are rather limited in their conflicts with one another by common rules and institutions.[6]

Bull states that the argument of international anarchy by previous scholars is weak since it false on the premise that the only condition for order is a supreme government. Order, he says, cannot be complete without factors like “reciprocal interest, a sense of community or general will, and habit of inertia.” [7]

Order as a pattern of behavior that sustains the primary goals of social life, is maintained by a sense of common interests in those goals. Rules sustain them by prescribing the pattern of behavior while the institutions make these rules effective. An example given is that the facts of human vulnerability to violence lead men to a common interest of restricting violence, thus we prevent states from going to war. Thus, in order to maintain order, states must have a sense of common interest in these elementary goals of social life and this may lead to a sense of common values. An international society identifies the relationship between states as bound by common rules and institutions.[8]

Bull gives emphasis on the Grotian prescription for international conduct, which prescribes that all states are bound by the rules and institutions of the society they form in their dealings with one another. Therefore, there should be an acceptance of the “requirements of coexistence and cooperation in a society of states.” [9]

Norms, Rules, Identity and Institutions

According to Finnemore and Sikkink, a norm is “a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity.”[10] An institution, on the other hand, is a “collection of practices and rules.”[11] Norms often limit the range of choice and constrain actions.

There are different types of norms: regulative norms, which order and constrain behavior; constitutive norms, which create new actors, interests, or categories of action; and evaluative or prescriptive norms, which, as the name implies, prescribe what needs to be done. [12]

Norms may be domestic, regional or international in nature. Domestic norms are usually interconnected with international norms. Many international norms, on the other hand, started first as domestic norms. International norms are cascaded through the filter of domestic structures and domestic norms. Simply put, international and domestic norms influence one another. [13]

Breaking a norm generates disapproval while conforming to a norm produces praise or is taken for granted if it is already highly internalized. There are however, no bad norms from the point of view of those who are promoting them. [14]

Norms have a life cycle divided into three stages. First stage is “norm emergence”; the second involves broad norm acceptance called “norm cascade”; and the third stage involves “internalization.” Changes at each stage is characterized by different actors, motives, and mechanisms of influence. Norm emergence is characterized by the persuasion of norm entrepreneurs who attempt to convince a critical mass of states to embrace new norms. In norm cascade, norm leaders attempt to recruit other states to become norm followers. Finnemore and Sikkink listed several factors that would facilitate norm cascades: “pressure for conformity, desire to enhance international legitimation, and the desire of state leaders to enhance their self-esteem”. A norm is said to have reached the stage of norm internalization when it becomes a habit and therefore already taken for granted. Not all norms complete the whole process. [15]

A vital question now is where do norms come from? Norms are actively created or built by agents or norm entrepreneurs who have strong notions about appropriate behavior in their community. New norms emerge in an environment where they must compete with other norms that have previously defined standards of appropriate behavior.

In most cases, for an emergent norm to be cascaded, it must first become institutionalized in specific sets of international rules and organizations, the United Nations for example. However, as Finnemore and Sikkink notes, it is a different thing all together when dealing with powerful states that are rarely coerced in agreeing to a norm. Organizations must be able to persuade these states that the old norm is actually wrong or inappropriate.[16]

Another important term in the constructivist language is rule. According to Nicholas Onuf, a rule is simply a statement that tells people what they should do. If we break these rules, there would be consequences. The ways, in which we deal with rules, whether we break or follow them, are called practices. Just by observing people’s practices, we would know what a rule is saying.[17]

An example of a rule is one that deals with coexistence, which confines the legitimate use of violence to sovereign states by limiting it to a particular kind of violence called ‘war.’ These rules seek to limit the causes or purposes for waging a war.[18]

Hedley Bull describes rules as merely intellectual constructs. They do not come from one central rulemaking authority but usually become embedded in customs. Rules play a part in social life only to the extent that they are effective. Members of the society make them effective even in the absence of a supreme government. In order to be effective, they must be obeyed to some degree. Rules must be made, communicated, administered, interpreted, enforced and legitimized in the eyes of the persons or groups to which they apply. Rules are legitimized if members of the society accept them as valid. States undertake the task of legitimizing the rules by promoting the acceptance of them and by using their powers of persuasion and propaganda to get support from other states. Rules must also be capable of adapting to the changing needs and circumstances and they must be ‘protected’ against developments in the society likely to undermine the effective operation of rules. [19]

Rules are said to be formal or legal when they are backed up by other rules. The more frequent agents follow the rules, the stronger the rule is normatively and the easier it is to make it formal.[20]

Rules and related practices form a pattern that suits the agents’ intentions. These patterns are what we call institutions or regimes. Institutions constitute an environment within which agents conduct themselves rationally.[21]

An institution, according to March and Olsen, does not mean an organization or administrative machinery. It is a set of habits and practices shaped towards the realization of common goals. It is an expression of collaboration among states and a means of sustaining collaboration.

As March and Olsen describes:

“An institution can be viewed as a relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behavior for specific groups of actors in specific situations. Such practices and rules are embedded in structures of meaning and schemes of interpretation that explain and legitimize particular identities and the practices and rules associated with them. Practices and rules are also embedded in resources and the principles of their allocation that make it possible for individuals to enact roles in an appropriate way and for a collectivity to socialize individuals and sanction those who wander from proper behavior.”[22]

Balance of power is one example of an institution in international relations. Rules on limiting the conduct of war help to keep the institution. In international relations, agents find a large number of formal commitment rules. These are the rules of international law where states performing as agents end up in partnership with other states.[23]

International society is said to be hesitantly ruled because states exercise their independence under the principle of sovereignty while still under a number of commitment-rules granting them privileges and duties with respect to other states.[24] Some of the basic rules of coexistence in international society often kept by states are the mutual respect for sovereignty, the keeping of agreements or treaties and the rules limiting the resort to violence.[25]

When political actors act in accordance to accepted rules and practices, they form an identity. Identities, like rules are said to be regulative and are molded by social interaction and experience.

Rationality vs. Institutions

Criticisms to the constructivist approach usually poke into its methodology. Critics say that it negates rationality. However, scholars like Kahler, Finnemore and Sikkink believe that the normative and the rational can in fact come together and they are intimately connected.

Nicholas Onuf proves this by saying that when human beings act as agents, they have particular goals in mind. Agents acknowledge these rules because they believe that these will help them reach their goals. Agents use whatever means available to them to achieve their goals. Acting to achieve these goals or interests is a rational conduct.[26]

However, Onuf acknowledges that institutions work to the advantage of some agents at the expense of other agents. As rational beings, those who benefit from the rules that apply to them are most inclined to follow the rules. On the other hand, those who benefit less are still inclined to follow the rules because doing so will benefit them more than not doing so. Those who do not benefit from following a rule may choose whatever resource is available in order to change the rule for their own advantage.[27]

Finnemore and Sikkink, emphasizes that in contemporary empirical research on norms, it has been shown how people’s ideas of what is good and what ought to be in the world becomes translated into political reality. Therefore the “ought” becomes the “is.”[28]

Ronald L. Jepperson, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Alexander Wendt saw how identity and interests come together in national security policy. They observed that states may develop interests linked to particular identities, or domestic identity politics may be reflected in foreign policy interests. In both cases, identity is prior to interests and may define those interests. The pursuit of those interests could be incorporated in a rationalist model.[29]

March and Olsen explains rationality and institutions in terms of logic of action and logic of appropriateness. In logic of action, action is driven by the logic of anticipated consequences and prior preferences. The interests of political actors come first and the interest of nation-states are derived from them. Thus, “changes in international institutions are the outcomes of local adaptation by political actors pursuing well-defined interests.”[30]

For March and Olsen, the logic of consequence is limited because it ignores the substantial role of identities, rules and institutions in shaping human behavior. On the other side are those who see action as driven by logic of appropriateness (norms and rules) and senses of identity.[31] Political actors, they say, are “constituted both by their interests, by which they evaluate their expected consequences, and by the rules embedded in their identities and political institutions. They calculate consequences and follow rules, and the relationship between the two is often subtle.”[32]

McSweeney studied the relations between identity and interests by looking into the dynamics of the Northern Ireland peace process. Identity and interests, he says, are interrelated dimensions of all stages in the formulation of security policy.[33] The identity theory exaggerates the causal role of identity and fails to account the role of interests in the change of identity. He says it is too idealistic to think that individuals will choose to change without the incentive or self-interest. It is therefore important to note that all rules are imbued with the special interests and values of those who made them.[34] However, Bull points out that these rules will serve the interests of the ruling elements of society than the interests of others.

“Since the influence exerted by members of a society in the process of making the rules is likely always to be unequal, any historical system of rules will be found to serve the interests of the ruling or dominant elements of the society more adequately than it serves the interests of the others. The special interests of the dominant elements in a society are reflected in the way in which the rules are defined.”[35]

However, there are rules and interests that are seen to be general—the limitation of violence, rules that agreements should be carried out and even rules on private property. The objective of those elements in any society, which seek to change the existing order, is to change the terms of these rules in such a way that they cease to serve the special interest of the presently dominant elements.

Next we shall see how rules, institutions as well as interests come together in probably one of the most compelling security issues in the world today—the global war on terrorism.

Global War on Terrorism

The global war on terrorism came as a response to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, which the Al Qaeda claimed. Just less than 24 hours after the 9/11 attacks, NATO invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and declared that the attacks were against all the NATO member countries. Australian Prime Minister John Howard also declared that Australia would invoke the ANZUS Treaty along similar lines. In the following months, NATO took a wide range of measures to respond to the threat of terrorism. The invasion of Afghanistan is seen as the first action of this war. [36]

The war against terrorism is an ongoing campaign with the goal of “ending international terrorism.” Its specific goals include preventing groups identified by the U.S. as terrorists from attacking and posing security threats to the U.S. and its allies; “spreading freedom” and liberal democracy and putting an end to the so-called state sponsored terrorism.[37]

The word terrorism itself is value-laden and is a social construct. Under the U.S. Federal Criminal Laws, terrorism is defined as: “activities that involve violent… <or life-threatening acts>… that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State and… appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and …<if domestic>…(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States…<if international>…(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States…”[38]

The United States strategy in the Global War on Terrorism is based on two strategy papers: the National Security Strategy and the Strategy for Countering Terrorism. The National Security Strategy highlights the preemptive war in states where identified terrorist groups are based.[39] The second strategy gives emphasis on the spread of democracy to fight terrorism. Democracy is seen as a antidote to frustration and the culture of conspiracy and violence that underly the development of terrorism.[40] The causes of terrorism, however remain contested.

U.S. President George W. Bush launched the war on terrorism with the support of NATO and other allies. It has taken on many forms such as diplomacy, cutting off ‘terrorist financing’, domestic provisions aimed to prevent future attacks as well as joint training and peacekeeping operations between states.

The war on terrorism has been described as an ideological battle or a battle of ideas. In one of his remarks about the global war on terror, U.S. President Bush acknowledged this, saying, “…today’s war on terror is like the Cold War. It is an ideological struggle with an enemy that despises freedom and pursues totalitarian aims….I vowed then that I would use all assets of our power to win the war on terror. And so I said we were going to stay on the offense two ways: one, hunt down the enemy and bring them to justice, and take threats seriously; and two, spread freedom”.[41]

The Bush administration has been continuously criticized and accused of violations of international law and human rights, particularly in the invasion of Iraq. The U.S. government’s use of military doctrines such as pre-emptive war and regime change as part of the war on terror has also been controversial. Opinion polls show limited support for the war. One of the reasons for this is the rising number military casualty. Despite the campaign however, more international terrorist incidents have been reported. The U.S. on the other hand, has claimed victories including the Afghan elections and the capture of alleged 9/11 planner Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.

Analysis

How are norms are adopted? How was the war in terrorism adopted by the international community?

As mentioned earlier, after the September 11 attacks on the United States, the international community was quick to adopt the call for a war on terrorism. According to Finnemore and Sikkink, it matters which states adopt the norm. Some states are critical to a norm’s adoption because they have a certain “moral stature.” The United States and other NATO member nations are seen as leaders in security issues therefore they are critical to the adoption of norms and rules related to security. Unanimity among states however is not a requirement in the adoption of norms. In the case of the war against terrorism, China and Russia have not adopted the norms.

During the process of norm cascade, more countries adopt the norm. Studies show that at this point, often an international or regional lobbying occurs and is much more influential or important than domestic politics.[42] People have seen the severity of the attack on the U.S. as portrayed in the media so it is easier for them to accept the war on terrorism.

States are not the only agents of socialization. Networks of norm entrepreneurs and international organizations also act as agents by pressuring targeted actors to adopt new policies and laws and to ratify treaties and by monitoring compliance with international standards.[43] Thus, we’ve seen how the United Nation Security Council pressured Iraq in its UNSC Resolution 1441 to comply with disarmament obligations or else “face serious consequences.”

Socialization is an important mechanism through which norm leaders persuade others to adhere. It is somewhat similar to ‘peer pressure’ among countries. Finnemore and Sikkink identified some of the motivations for giving in to such pressure– legitimation, conformity and esteem.[44]

Claude describes international organizations as “custodians of the seals of international approval and disapproval.” Their role, he says is to establish and assure the adherence to international norms. States also give importance to international legitimation because it contributes to perceptions of domestic legitimacy held by a state’s own citizens.[45]

“International legitimation is important insofar as it reflects back on a government’s domestic basis of legitimation and consent and thus ultimately on its ability to stay in power.”[46]

Thus, we conform to the war against terrorism in order to demonstrate that we “belong”, as Robert Axelrod puts it.

Self-esteem is another motivation for states to accept new norms. Esteem suggests that state sometimes follow norms because they want others to think well of them, and they want to think well of themselves. This is what Kenneth Waltz meant when he suggested some of the ways in which socialization occurs: “emulation (of heroes), praise (for behavior that conforms to group norms), and ridicule (for deviation).” States join the war because they want other states to think well of them, that they have the political will to fight terrorism and to protect their citizens. In the area of human rights, for example as Finnemore and Sikkink observed, there are studies that suggest that some state leaders care deeply about their international image as human rights violators so they make significant policy changes in to change that image. In the war against terrorism, non-compliance put states in a position where they are viewed as sponsoring terrorism.

Having discussed the ways in which norms cascade, which norms are likely to spread throughout the system? Ann Florini argues that prominent norms, those held by states as successful and desirable models, are most likely to diffuse. The fact that Western norms are more likely to diffuse internationally would seem to follow this observation. Institutionalists in sociology have also argued that norms making universalistic claims about what is good for all people in all places (such as many Western norms) have more expansive potential than localized and particularistic normative frameworks.[47]

Finnemore and Sikkink also discussed how world historical events such as war or major depressions in the international system can lead to a search for new ideas and norms thus, the September 11 attack and other events leading to it paved the way for the global war on terrorism

When a norm reaches the tipping point, wherein enough states and critical states adopt it, the new norm redefines the appropriate behavior for the community and forms an identity.

The search for an identity

The U.S. led war against terrorism puts forward the idea of democracy as a component in combating terrorism. It follows the presumption that if authoritarian regimes are replaced by democratic institutions, then terrorism will be defeated. March and Olsen noted that democratic states are likely to import democratic norms and decision-making rules in international encounters, as seen clearly in the war against terrorism. In turn, experience with shared rules facilitates the development of rule-based international institutions and collective identity.[48]

The problem with this argument however is that it totally ignores the interests and the existing norms and institutions of individual states. Even in the development of a European identity, the European Union authorities have had difficulties in constructing collective identities because it confronts already existing identities. In most areas where the war on terrorism is centered, religion and state are tightly fused together, making it all the more difficult to establish a collective identity.

Ethnic, religious, linguistic, regional, functional, and class identities have already created solidarities that do not coincide with nation-state boundaries, thus we see Islamic fundamentalism as one of the factors in the war against terrorism. The resurgence of sub state and supranational identities gives importance to concepts like culture and identity in understanding international relations.[49]

Interests and Institutions

As stated by some scholars, interests and institutions can in fact come together to explain phenomena. For these scholars, rules are needed to guide the behavior of states to achieve their common interest in elementary goals of social life. In the case of the war on terrorism, pre-emptive war as a rule is said to be essential to achieve the common aim of lasting peace.

March and Olsen further discussed that although individual states act rationally to achieve coherent goals, such attainment is limited primarily not by explicit rules regulating international encounters but by simultaneous competitive efforts of other states to maximize their own interests.

Thus as McSweeney puts it, “We are collectively who we want to be, but the process of change has been conditioned in large part by the stick and carrot, the pressure and blandishment of material interests.”[50]

Sometimes, as Grotius notes, states claim a just cause for going to war while hiding their real motives.

US interest on the war

McSweeney noted that the strategic thinking underlying the US post-Cold War foreign policy as stipulated in Pentagon’s ‘Defense Planning Guidance’ was for the United States to continue to dominate the international system and to “’discourage’ the ‘advanced industrial nations from challenging our leadership or…even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.’” Benjamin Schwarz, a Rand Corporation analyst, argues that it is an error to assume that American foreign policy is a response to the pressures of other states. He emphasizes the causal significance of material interests and views the US security policy as having been ‘primarily determined not by external threats but by the apparent demands of America’s economy.’[51]

Bull makes the same point when he said that states do not go to war if, as a result, their economy would plummet.

“States do not in fact so exhaust their strength and invention in providing security against one another that the lives of their inhabitants are solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short; they do not as a rule invest resources in war and military preparations to such an extent that their economic fabric is ruined. On the contrary, the armed forces of states, by providing security against external attack and internal disorder, establish the condition under which economic improvements may take place within their borders. The absence of a universal government has not been incompatible with international economic interdependence.”[52]

So where do norms and institutions come in? It has been said that the war on terrorism is a war of ideals. One of the objectives and strategies of the US is to win this war of ideals. As the lead agency in the war, the U.S. has defined what terrorism is and who the terrorists are. The U.S. has been compelling the international society and even forcing other states to comply with their ideals of democracy and to denounce existing norms and institutions.

A clear example of this are the events following the U.S. attack in Somalia. In mid-2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), an Islamist faction campaigning to restore “law and order” through the Sharia Law, had rapidly taken control of much of southern Somalia. On December 14, 2006, US Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer claimed that Al-Qaeda cell operatives were controlling the Islamic Courts Union, which was of course denied by the ICU. On January 8th, 2007 the US launched a strike in Somalia against the suspects using AC-130 gunships.[53]

Another clear example is that of Iraq. Iraq has been listed as a State Sponsor of Terror by the United States since 1990. It has maintained poor relations with the United States since the Gulf War and we all know the US’ interest in that region. After the September 11 attacks, the U.S. government claimed that Iraq was a threat to the United States because they said that Iraq could begin to use its alleged Weapons of Mass Destruction to aid terrorist groups. This is despite Iraq’s missing role in the September 11 attacks and despite the fact that it had no known history of a significant working relationship with Al Qaeda.[54] We all know what happened after the Coalition of theWilling was assembled by the United States to invade Iraq.

When Israel invaded Leba0non to destroy the Hezbollah, also linked to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the US government was quick to defend that it was a front in the war on terrorism. With these cases, one can clearly see how the U.S. has been influencing the international society and pushing for its own norms, rules and institutions as well as its own interests.

Those who criticize the war on terrorism argue that you cannot have a war against hard to encompass issues and ideas such as terrorism and that war is waged only against states or entities. It has also been argued that the word terrorism is difficult to define for this is linked to the argument that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”.

It has also been noted that by openly declaring “war” on terrorism, this could be read as entitling any terrorists to engage in militant or offensive acts of war with some legitimacy thus, it can be counterproductive. In fact, the British Foreign Office has asked their ministers to refrain from using the phrase “war on terror” because of its perceived role in increasing tensions with Islamic countries.[55] A professor even argued that the war on terrorism can lead to a state of perpetual war because it is based on Bush’s domestic crusade against sin and evil.

At the heart of this complex of rules is the widely accepted principle that each state should respect the sovereignty of every other state over its own citizens and domain, in return for the right to expect similar respect for its own sovereignty from other states. The outcome of this central rule is the rule that states will not intervene forcibly or dictatorially in one another’s internal affairs. However, these rules on the sovereignty of states are now being challenged by the U.S. led war on terrorism.

Conclusion

The global war on terrorism, as its name implies, really is a war against existing norms, rules and institutions. Critics say that its goal will produce a state of “perpetual war” since it is based on relative ideas of good and evil.

So the question now is when will this war end? March and Olsen notes that institutions are most likely to change if they are seen as failure. They say that people are less likely to follow institutional rules if they believe that the rules produce poor results. If institutions miss their targets, the failure creates a loss of confidence in existing rules and a search for new alternatives.[56] On this note, it can be argued that states will continue to support the war on terrorism only if the positive results will outweigh the losses.

In the past, normative phenomena were pushed aside in research because of the difficulty in methodology but scholars saw that the normative and the rational can go hand in hand. According to Finnemore and Sikkink, contemporary scholars must “think seriously about the micro foundations on which theoretical claims about norms rest, and evaluate those claims in the context of carefully designed historical and empirical research.”[57] Kahler agrees that cultural explanations do not overturn state choices and decisions but rather enrich them.

It would be vital therefore for states to also look at the normative aspects of the conflict in deciding whether or not to join in the global war on terrorism. In the end, as McSweeney puts it, “We choose who we are and who we want to be. We are no more determined by universal laws of anarchic social structure to act out the roles assigned to states in conflictual association by orthodox political science, than we are to act out the cooperative roles structured for us by a comprehensive security policy or peace process.”[58]

By understanding better the world we live in, we recover what McSweeney calls “the human and moral dimension of security and security policy.”[59]

[1] Miles Kahler, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics (Cambridge, Ma: MIT Press, 1999): p. 281.

[2] Ibid, p. 286.

[3] Ibid, p. 296.

[4] Nicholas Onuf, “Constructivism: A User’s Manual” in Vendulka Kubalkova, International Relations in a Constructed World (Armonk, New York and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1998): p. 59.

[5] Ibid, p. 62.

[6] Hedley Bull, The Anarchichal Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1982), pp. 24-26.

[7] Ibid, p. 48.

[8] Ibid., p. 53-57.

[9] Ibid, p. 27.

[10] Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics (Cambridge, Ma: MIT Press, 1999): p. 251

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid, p. 253.

[14] Ibid, p. 252.

[15] Ibid, p. 255-265.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Onuf, op.cit., p. 59.

[18] Bull, op.cit., p. 69.

[19] Ibid., pp. 55-57.

[20] Onuf, op.cit., p. 69.

[21] Ibid, p. 70.

[22] James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics (Cambridge, Ma: MIT Press, 1999): p. 308.

[23] Onuf, op.cit., p. 71.

[24] Ibid., p. 77.

[25] Bull, op.cit., p. 55.

[26] Onuf, op.cit., p. 60.

[27] Ibid, pp. 60-61.

[28] Finnemore and Sikkink, op.cit., p. 276.

[29] Kahler, op.cit., p. 296.

[30] March and Olsen, op.cit. p. 311.

[31] Ibid, pp. 309-311.

[32] Ibid, p. 312.

[33] Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 197.

[34] Ibid, p. 210.

[35] Bull, op.cit., p. 55.

[36] Http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1703

[37] Http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/counter_terrorism

[38] Http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/casecode/uscodes/18/parts/i/chapters/113b/toc.html

[39] Http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/sectionV.html

[40] Http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/nationalsecurity/index.html

[41] Http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/wh/rem/64287.htm

[42] Finnemore and Sikkink, op.cit., p. 262.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid, p. 263

[45] Ibid.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid, p. 266.

[48] March and Olsen, op.cit., p. 322.

[49] Ibid, p. 306.

[50] McSweeney, op.cit., pp. 182-83.

[51] Ibid, p. 188.

[52] Bull, op.cit., p. 47.

[53] Http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L14556061.htm

[54] Http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1998/12/16/clinton/index.html?eref=sitesearch

[55] Http://observer.guardian.co.uk/politics/story/0,,1968668,00.html

[56] March and Olsen, op.cit., p. 326.

[57] Finnemore and Sikkink, op.cit., p. 250.

[58] McSweeney, op.cit., p. 196.

[59] Ibid, p. 201.